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The United States has repeatedly engaged in irregular warfare—including 
counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare—throughout its 
history. However, despite its familiarity with irregular warfare, there is reluctance on the 
part of U.S. presidents, military leaders, and even the general public to engage in this 
form of war.  
This thesis asks why the U.S. security mindset is focused on traditional large-
scale warfare, even when the threats the United States has faced, and will continue to 
face, are mostly irregular. To answer this question, this thesis uses Arreguín-Toft’s 
strategic interaction model—which looks at why same-approach and opposite-approach 
strategies (direct and indirect) favor strong and weak actors differently—to analyze the 
U.S. Revolutionary War, when the United States was the weak actor, and the Vietnam 
conflict, when the United States was the strong actor, and to assess whether the United 
States implemented the correct form of strategic interaction in each conflict.  
This thesis finds that the United States’ propensity for traditional large-scale 
warfare is based upon its desire to achieve victory in the shortest amount of time. 
Furthermore, a preponderance of resources and instruments of war has also impelled the 
United States to employ overwhelming mass, maneuver, and firepower, instead of 
irregular warfare with a protracted timeline strategy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the American Revolutionary War, British General Frederick Haldiman 
stated, “The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular army.”1  A 
wounded British soldier after the Battle of Concord wrote that the American colonial 
rebels, “… did not fight us like a regular army, only like savages behind trees, stone 
walls, and out of the woods and fields,” while another Redcoat remarked, “They would 
never engage us properly.”2  These irregular warfare tactics used by the American 
colonials ultimately helped win the Revolutionary War even though George Washington 
continually strived for a professional, well-trained army that could defeat the British in 
conventional, force-on-force battle.  
The history of the United States is steeped in successful irregular warfare 
campaigns and conflicts from Francis Marion in the American Revolutionary War to the 
United States’ indirect approach countering insurgencies in Latin America in the latter 
half of the twentieth century.  However, despite many unconventional, 
counterinsurgency, or foreign internal defense successes, the contributions of irregular 
warfare have repeatedly been forgotten.  The current U.S. Army Field Manual, 
Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24) states, “Throughout its history, the U.S. military has had 
to relearn the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) while conducting operations 
against adaptive insurgent enemies.”3  
Although insurgency has become the dominant form of conflict since the Second 
World War,4 the Unites States has continued to prefer conventional war, what this thesis 
will call traditional large-scale warfare. Time and time again, despite the success of 
irregular warfare in the twentieth century, the U.S. focus remained fixed on traditional 
                                                 
1 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 18. 
2 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 66. 
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006): ix. 
4 Boot, Invisible Armies, xx. 
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large-scale warfare.  A few examples of U.S. irregular warfare leanings include: the 
1950–1954 U.S. approach to the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, President 
Eisenhower’s farewell speech in 1961 warning of the possible grave implications of the 
immense military establishment and acquisition of unwarranted influence by the newly 
emerging military industrial complex,5 President John F. Kennedy’s counterinsurgency 
program in the early 1960s to combat Nikita Krushchev’s support for “wars of 
liberation,”6 and America’s successful indirect approach to countering Marxist and 
communist insurgencies in Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Regardless of how often the United States takes part in or implements irregular warfare, 
the predominant means of warfare remain conventional or traditional large-scale warfare.  
This pattern of behavior is noted in The U.S. Army’s and Marine Corps COIN manual: 
“Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American 
military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 
years ago.”7 What has continually inhibited the United States military and security 
mindset from embracing irregular warfare?   
This thesis attempts to explain why, throughout America’s history, a contentious 
“one or the other” debate has occurred between irregular and traditional warfare, and why 
irregular warfare continually gets sidelined despite repeated engagements in 
counterinsurgencies and unconventional warfare.  Specifically, this thesis delves into why 
irregular warfare is routinely looked upon as a lesser form of war that has been repeatedly 
relegated to the dustbins of U.S. military history.  Why is the U.S. military and U.S. 
security mindset traditional warfare focused, even when threats we have faced are 
frequently not traditional? This thesis proposes that, only when this phenomenon is 
understood, can an honest debate about the utility of a traditional warfare strategy versus 
irregular warfare strategy proceed.  
                                                 
5 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” January 17, 1961, accessed March 22, 2013, 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address/1961_01_17_Press_Rele
ase.pdf . 
6 Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, 
Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990, (2002), accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.statecraft.org/chapter6.html.  
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), vii. 
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A. THE CURRENT DEBATE—COINISTA’S VERSUS COINATA’S 
Despite America’s success in irregular warfare during the Revolution, the 
“American Way of War” is characterized as achieving victory resulting from 
overwhelming force and the absolute quantity of available assets.8 Even in 1983, almost 
30 years ago, Edward N. Luttwak, in “Notes on Low-Intensity Conflict,” acknowledged 
that low intensity conflicts are merely deemed by the U.S. Defense Establishment as a 
lesser-included case of “real” war.9 Recently, after 12 years of irregular warfare and 
COIN conflict in Afghanistan, Fred Kaplan, author of The Insurgents: David Petraeus 
and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, claims that Afghanistan is COIN’s 
Waterloo.10 The fact that historians, journalists, and members of the U.S. military are 
equating the COIN strategy in Afghanistan with Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, which 
ended his reign as emperor, is telling.  Are we once again dismissing irregular warfare as 
a lesser-included case of “real” war? Is engaging in irregular warfare the path to U.S. loss 
of global power and possible demise? This traditional warfare—irregular warfare debate 
has manifested itself into an anti-COIN, pro-COIN argument, separated into the “Coinista 
versus Coinata”11 camps, the former represented by retired Lieutenant Colonel John 
Nagl, and the latter by Colonel Gian Gentile.  
Retired Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 
explores and compares the British success in Malaya from 1948–1960 to the United 
States’ failure in Vietnam from 1960–1973.  Nagl argues that the main reason for the 
success of the British Army in Malaya compared to the failures of the United States in 
                                                 
8 Hy S. Rothstein, “Less is More: the Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an era of Collapsing 
States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 278. 
9 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters (December 1983): 333. 
10 Octavian Manea, “The American Way of War After COIN’s Waterloo: An Interview with Fred 
Kaplan.” Small Wars Journal (March 5, 2013): 1, accessed March 22, 2013, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-american-way-of-war-after-coins-waterloo-an-interview-with-fred-
kaplan. 
11 Student Conference on US Affairs (SCUSA) 64, “Leading in Lean Times: Assuring Accountability 
and Assessing American Priorities in and Age of Austerity. Long Live COIN? Dealing with Insurgencies 
and Internationalized Conflicts on a Budget.” United States Military Academy (November 7–11, 2012), 




Vietnam was the result of different cultural organizations between the two armies, 
simply, the British Army was a learning institution and the U.S. Army was not.12  
Because the British cultural organization promoted learning, they were better able to 
adapt to counterinsurgency tactics and strategies during the Malayan Emergency.  
Consequently, Nagl argues that the United States must be able to adapt to a global 
insurgency in the future and be able to create an operational capability to influence the 
actions of nations and subnational groups.13  Nagl suggests modifying the U.S. Army’s 
force structure to incorporate an “advisor command” to accomplish this goal.14  
Nagl’s recommendations are met with contentious disagreement by perhaps the 
loudest voice for the anti-COIN argument, U.S. Army Colonel Gian P. Gentile. Writing 
articles with titles such as “COIN is Dead: U.S. Army Must Put Strategy Over Tactics,” 
“Beneficial War: The Conceit of American Counterinsurgency,” and his book, Wrong 
Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of COIN, Gentile argues that the U.S. military’s 
current obsession with COIN is equivalent to the erroneous belief in airpower in World 
War II being able to shorten wars while at the same time “saving blood and treasure on 
both sides.”15  In Gentile’s article, “COIN is Dead,” he argues that “future battlefields 
demand a ground force built around the pillars of firepower, protection and mobility.”16 
He further contends that the current Army force structure will need to change but will be 
unable to if they maintain their obsession and distraction with counterinsurgency 
tactics.17 
Identifying whether or not Nagl’s adaptive organizational culture and advisory 
command structure or Gentile’s firepower centric force is necessary to fight America’s 
                                                 
12 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
xxii. 
13 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, xvi. 
14 John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command,” Military 
Review (September-October 2008), 24–26. 
15 Gian P. Gentile, “Beneficial War,” Harvard International Review, accessed February 7, 2013, 
http://hir.harvard.edu/india-in-transition/beneficial-war-0. 
16 Gian P. Gentile, “COIN is Dead,” World Politics Review, accessed February 7, 2013, 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10731/coin-is-dead-u-s-army-must-put-strategy-over-tactics. 
17 Gentile, “COIN is Dead.” 
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future wars requires one to look at the type of conflicts that the United States will most 
likely find itself in in the future.  This debate falls into two main categories.  One argues 
that the United States faces a “new” type of war, often explained as “post-heroic” 
warfare.  Essentially, war as we knew it in the Twentieth Century, industrialized war 
fought by state powers, has ceased to exist.  Prominent authors on the subject of a new 
type of war, such as Mary Kaldor, Martin Van Creveld, and Rupert Smith, believe this 
new type of conflict consists of war amongst the people.18  These wars will not be waged 
by armies but by groups of terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers.19   
The other side of the debate suggests that war, in its truest form, has really not 
changed at all.  Colin Gray argues that whatever might be changing about warfare, it is 
not, and cannot be the nature or warfare itself; the nature of war is eternal.20  However, 
even stating that warfare itself cannot change, Gray explains that the United States’ high-
tech transformation will only be of limited value due to the fact that America’s foes will 
“pursue ways of war that do not test U.S. strengths.”21 Consequently, the United States, 
despite its technological, numerical, and professional military advantages, will still face 
irregular warfare threats in the foreseeable future. 
Both schools of thought have a common thread:  The fact that whether the nature 
of warfare remains the same or warfare will be predominantly fought by non-state actors, 
the United States’ technological, firepower, and overwhelming force advantages will only 
be of moderate benefits.22  Additionally, the fact that there is such an extreme imbalance 
of military power in favor of the United States, it will be uncommon for America’s 
adversaries to engage it in force on force traditional warfare.  This observation supports 
Rupert Smith’s analysis “[t]hat a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred: from 
armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation between a 
                                                 
18 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2007), 5. 
19 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 197.   
20 Colin S. Gray, “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” Parameters (Spring 
2005), 17. 
21 Gray, “How Has War Changed?” 21. 
22 Gray, “How Has War Changed?” 21. 
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range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types of weapons, 
often improvised. The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war. The new one is 
the paradigm of war amongst the people.”23  
Because of the commonalities among the new war and old war proponents, it 
stands to reason that the United States will most likely find itself engaged in some form 
of irregular warfare for the foreseeable future.  Unfortunately, the current COIN anti-
COIN, or irregular warfare—traditional warfare, debate focuses solely on which strategy 
is best for America’s future global security. Furthermore, the analysis that does exist on 
the pro-traditional warfare mindset of the U.S. military primarily focuses on the outputs, 
not the inputs.  Such analysis most commonly faults the traditional warfare-centric joint, 
professional, military-education (JPME) system, U.S military doctrine, and/or force 
materiel, weapons, and technology production utilized to wage traditional warfare.  The 
arguments do not explain or determine the root cause or causes of the U.S. military and 
the national security mindset being predisposed to traditional warfare as the nation’s 
primary warfighting strategy.  
B. HYPOTHESES ON THE CAUSES OF THE TRADITIONAL WARFARE 
MINDSET 
There are several periods in America’s history where it appeared the U.S. security 
mindset and the armed forces were leaning towards an irregular warfare focus.  From the 
French and Indian War to the Civil War, the United States incorporated, or even relied 
upon, irregular warfare. However, just when it appeared the United States should have 
maintained an irregular warfare approach to national security due to its success, the 
American “conventional” wisdom shifted to a conventional warfare approach. Max Boot 
calls this the “nomad (or guerrilla) paradox,” how a smaller force, utilizing superior 
mobility, effective leadership, and the ability to mobilize large portions of society while 
waging a war completely different than that of its conventional enemies is able to defeat 
them. This is only the first half of the paradox however, he also identifies that even 
successful guerrilla forces ultimately switch to the same conventional tactics that were 
                                                 
23 Smith, The Utility of Force, 5. 
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used by the superior force they defeated.24  Boot argues that successful guerrilla tactics of 
history’s fast moving nomadic tribes were of little use in defending the territory of its 
newly conquered states.25 Additionally Boot contributes that once the nomadic 
“irregulars” started to live a more sedentary lifestyle, they lost their superior individual 
talents and unit cohesion that made them successful at irregular warfare in the first place. 
Although the trend predicts guerrillas and insurgents move away from guerilla tactics 
once they become successful, time and time again when guerrilla warfare seemed to be 
eclipsed by the latest and greatest capability, industrial warfare in the 1910s, aerial 
warfare in the 1930s, or nuclear warfare in the 1950s, the dominance of irregular warfare 
came to the forefront.26 
General Rupert Smith, in The Utility of Force, believes that the introduction of 
nuclear weapons made the “old” form of warfare, industrial war, incapable of serving as a 
deciding event. He explains that unfortunately strategic planners are developing force 
structure and plans with the industrial war concept in mind but fighting non-industrial 
wars against non-state participants.27 Smith list four distinct attributes that set nation 
states’ regular armies apart from non-state actors’ irregular forces: an organized military 
body, a hierarchical structure answerable to the highest in the entity or state, a legal status 
to bear arms and to have a separate disciplinary code, and centralized funding for the 
purchase of warlike materiel.  However, if the development of nuclear weapons was 
responsible for deterring traditional warfare post World War II, why was irregular 
warfare utilized predominantly by weaker nation states prior to the advent of nuclear war 
and why did stronger powers, such as the United States, not adopt an irregular warfare 
focus? 
Based upon the shift from an initial focus on irregular warfare during America’s 
founding to traditional warfare later in its existence, and the reluctance to revert back to 
irregular warfare as a primary course of action when it seemed appropriate, there must be 
                                                 
24 Boot, Invisible Armies, 42. 
25 Boot, Invisible Armies, 43. 
26 Boot, Invisible Armies, xx. 
27 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, 4. 
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one or several inhibiting factors preventing the U.S. security mindset and the U.S. 
military from accepting irregular warfare as an equal form of warfare, on par with 
traditional warfare.  
This thesis aims to test the following hypotheses on the conditions that have 
fueled the persisting traditional large-scale war mindset in America. 
• Hypothesis 1: The development and strength of the Unites States’ military 
industrial complex inhibits an irregular warfare approach to our nation’s 
military and security mindset by perpetuating and sustaining traditional 
warfare force structure and materiel via political interests, economic 
impact, and commercial lobbying of politicians. 
• Hypothesis 2: Geopolitical posturing by nation-states seeking legitimacy 
and prestige on the international stage ensures a traditional warfare 
mindset and security posture.  Essentially a “might is right” philosophy 
dominates international geopolitics and the universally understood display 
of power—force projection.  
• Hypothesis 3:  The organizational construct ingrained over time that 
focuses on a hierarchical authoritative command structure striving to 
maximize command and control efficiencies hinders irregular warfare 
concepts that espouse decentralized operations.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis attempts to explain why the United States’ military and security 
mindset is traditional war focused by highlighting two specific periods in the United 
States’ history where it could have maintained an irregular warfare focused military but 
chose a traditional large-scale warfare mindset instead, and conversely, where it most 
likely could have changed courses and adopted an irregular warfare mindset but chose to 
remain traditional war focused instead.  Simply stated, why did the U.S. mindset change 
during its founding from one of irregular warfare to traditional large-scale warfare when, 
by all accounts, the irregular mindset was effective, and conversely, why did the 
traditional large-scale warfare mindset not revert back to irregular warfare when it 
appears as though it should have?   
Evidence used for this thesis is broken down into three main categories: 
information suggesting the threat irregular warfare has posed to international security in 
the past and will continue to pose to the United States’ in the future; academic and policy 
 9 
literature citing the current contentious debate between the opposing camps supporting 
irregular warfare and traditional warfare, and data analyzing specific time periods in our 
nation’s history analyzing irregular warfare and traditional warfare mindsets.  
Sources used involve accounts from military and civilian leadership that capture 
behaviors of the respective time periods where the traditional warfare and irregular 
warfare concepts converged. This thesis also takes into account material analyzing the 
utilization of tactics, techniques, procedures, and overall strategy to vet the three 
hypotheses during each case study. U.S. Department of Defense capstone manuals and 
doctrinal publications are utilized to assist in framing the irregular warfare—traditional 
warfare debate and secondly, provide insight into the current and future strategic way-
ahead for the United States military. 
Through the use of primary and secondary sources, this thesis assesses what 
factors contribute most to the U.S. military’s predilection of looking at irregular warfare 
as an alternate, or lesser, form of warfare. This thesis analyzes the American 
Revolutionary War, where America was the weaker actor, and the Vietnam War, where 
the United States was the stronger actor, to consider the conditions under which direct 
and indirect forms of warfare were chosen. In both wars, the United States chose 
strategies that were counterintuitive to their circumstances. In the Revolutionary war, the 
smaller, weaker Colonial forces longed for a conventional, large scale confrontation with 
Britain, despite being better situated to choose an indirect approach. In the Vietnam war, 
the United States—the stronger power—began with an indirect approach, through 
training and advising, when large scale confrontation was the more likely choice.  By 
looking at the counterintuitive choices made by the United States in these two specific 
periods in U.S. history this thesis strives to understand the factors that have led the 
United States to choose the type of warfare in which they engage.   Identifying these 
conditions is critical in understanding and proceeding with the current national debate on 
the degree to which irregular warfare and traditional large-scale warfare will play a part 
in our nation’s future global security and defense. This thesis proceeds as follows: 
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Chapter II looks at historical and current military doctrine to identify the main 
characteristics, key similarities, and differences between traditional and irregular warfare 
in order to determine when and why each is best employed. The chapter then outlines 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction model, including its strengths and limits, to 
analyze each case study. The thesis also seeks to test whether his model adequately 
addresses the counterintuitive nature of irregular warfare strategy and current U.S. 
military doctrine.   
Chapter III provides a case study on the American Revolutionary War from 1775–
1783, why it was fought, and its key battles to determine how the United States, the 
weaker actor, defeated the more powerful British military. This chapter concludes with 
key reasons the nascent United States predominantly employed an irregular warfare 
strategy, but continually strived to achieve a traditional warfare capability. 
Chapter IV offers a case study on the Vietnam War from 1961–1975, when the 
United States was the more powerful actor, why it was fought, and its key phases to 
determine the predominant warfare strategy, and more importantly, how the North 
Vietnamese, a weak actor, defeated the most powerful military in the world. The chapter 
concludes with identifying key reasons the United States repeatedly chose a traditional 
warfare strategy.  
Chapter V concludes with summary findings and offers thoughts on why the 
United States prefers traditional warfare over irregular warfare and how the United States 







II. TRADITIONAL AND IRREGULAR WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Carl Von Clausewitz stated war is simply a duel but on a larger scale,28 
summarizing “[e]ssentially war is fighting.”29  Regardless of what devices man creates to 
give him an advantage in fighting, Clausewitz concludes, “…no matter how it is 
constituted, the concept of fighting remains unchanged. That is what is meant by war.”30  
Although Clausewitz states the nature of war remains the same, he also explains that the 
most supreme, far-reaching judgment a leader can make is to establish “…the kind of war 
on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most 
comprehensive.”31  
Current U.S. military doctrine echoes Clausewitzian theory, explaining that the 
basic nature of war is immutable, although warfare evolves constantly.32 Warfare, similar 
to Clausewitz’ analysis of fighting, is “the mechanism, method, or modality of armed 
conflict against an enemy. It is the “how” of waging war. Warfare continues to change 
and be transformed by society…”33 Just as Clausewitz’ explained the most important 
decision leaders can make is identifying first and foremost which “kind of war” they are 
going to engage in, current U.S. military doctrine explains that understanding the nature 
of warfare, how it changes, frames the “context” of how wars are fought. Understanding 
this context helps leaders make informed decisions on how campaigns and operations 
                                                 
28 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. 
29 Clausewitz, On War, 127. 
30 Clausewitz, On War, 127. 
31 Clausewitz, On War, 8889. 
32 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), I–3. 
33 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–4. 
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should be conducted.34  Current U.S. military doctrine identifies two basic forms of 
warfare, traditional and irregular, to frame the context of how war is fought.35  
This chapter will attempt to explain traditional and irregular warfare, highlighting 
each form’s main characteristics and key differences. These criteria will then be used in 
following chapters to analyze key points in U.S. history to determine whether or not the 
“first of all strategic questions” according to Clausewitz or “understanding the proper 
context of war” according to U.S. doctrine, was properly analyzed and implemented. This 
chapter will also highlight Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction on Conflict 
Outcomes Model that helps identify which form of warfare to choose and why. This 
analysis, comparison, and conflict outcome determination will hopefully shed light on 
key reasons the United States could have utilized a strategy of irregular warfare but chose 
to emphasize traditional warfare instead.  
B. TRADITIONAL WARFARE 
A plethora of terms have been used in literature and military publications to 
describe state-on-state warfare from regular, to industrial, and the most common, and 
probably the most preferred, conventional. The latest edition of the Doctrine for the 
Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, however, uses the term 
“traditional warfare,” defining it as “a violent struggle for the domination between 
nation-states or coalitions and alliances of states.”36 The term “traditional” is misleading. 
One can endlessly argue, as many do, which form of warfare is actually traditional.  As 
Max Boot argues “[i]n fact, conventional warfare is the relatively recent invention,”37 or 
as the United States Marine Corps Tentative Manual for Combating Irregular Threats 
states, “[t]he traditional form of war is actually more irregular.”38 Joint doctrine writers 
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38 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular 
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must have recognized this juxtaposition and explained the term traditional warfare was 
chosen because it is the form most often employed in the West since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 “that reserved for the nation-state alone a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force.”39 In order to stay consistent with the most current U.S. military 
terminology, traditional warfare will be used throughout this thesis when referring to 
what is better known as conventional, or “traditional large-scale” warfare.  
Traditional warfare is armed conflict between nation-states conducting force-on-
force battles to defeat each other’s militaries, destroy each other’s war making capability, 
and retain territory in order to force a change in the adversary’s government or policies. 
40 The focus of traditional warfare is the adversary’s armed forces with the objective of 
influencing the adversary’s government.41 Victory is achieved when the adversary’s 
armed forces have been defeated, its war-making capacity has been destroyed, or key 
terrain or territory has been seized.42 This is typically accomplished in traditional warfare 
through the use of overwhelming firepower and maneuver, via a series of offensive, 
defensive, and stability operations conducted against the opposing nation-state’s centers 
of gravity.43  
Focusing on maneuver, firepower, and the enemy’s center of gravity is entrenched 
in the writings penned almost 200 years ago by military theorists Carl Von Clausewitz 
and Antoine Henri Jomini, both products of the Napoleonic revolution in warfare that 
emphasized mass, firepower, and maneuver.  Although Jomini focuses on the science of 
war and its fundamental principles, while Clausewitz focuses more on the theory and 
philosophical aspects of war,44 both stress mass, maneuver, and attacking the enemy’s 
center of gravity at a decisive place and time.  Jomini determines there is one great secret 
of war that consists of “the very simple maneuver of carrying the bulk of [one’s] forces 
                                                 
39 Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–5. 
40 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept [IWJOC] (Version 1.0) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 7–8. 
41 Department of Defense, IWJOC Version 1.0, 8. 
42 Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–5. 
43 Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–5. 
44 George C. Aucoin, Jr., “Clausewitz or Jomini?” Marine Corps Gazette 72, no. 8 (1988): 102. 
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upon a single wing of the hostile army.”45  He believes this one great secret leads to one 
fundamental principle of war, strategically maneuvering the mass of one’s army against 
the decisive points in a theater of war.46  
Clausewitz also emphasizes massing and maneuvering one’s forces at the decisive 
point; “[t]he best strategy is always to be very strong: first in general, and then at the 
decisive point…there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than keeping one’s forces 
concentrated.” 47 He identifies the enemy’s center of gravity as “...the hub of all power 
and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point which all our energies 
should be directed.”48 He believes the enemy’s center of gravity is its armed forces. 
Therefore, the quickest way to defeat one’s adversary is by defeating its military.49  
The quick, decisive defeat of an adversary’s armed forces is another aspect of 
traditional warfare that historical literature and current military doctrine cites as a main 
objective and therefore one of its defining characteristics. This is demonstrated in 
Clausewitz’ writings when he explains that “[t]he maximum use of force should be used 
from the outset to achieve decisive results in the shortest possible time.”50 Expecting a 
quick, decisive victory is also reinforced in current military doctrine where the U.S. Army 
Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, states “[i]f U.S. forces fight, the Nation expects us to 
inflict a defeat of sufficient magnitude that the enemy abandons his objectives and agrees 
to peace on our terms. In other words, Americans expect us to dominate and win 
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lethality, defined as the capacity for physical destruction and one of the tenets of unified 
land operations, “…is fundamental to all other military capabilities and the most basic 
building block for military operations.”52  
Lethality, accomplished by overwhelming combat power, in the form of mass, 
maneuver, and firepower is the essence of traditional warfare. It caters to powerful 
nation-states with an advanced industrial base and technological capabilities that can 
overpower peer competitors.  Raw power en mass thus becomes a defining factor in 
traditional warfare. The Great Wars of the early twentieth century, World War I and 
World War II, are classic examples of Westphalian state-on-state “traditional” warfare, 
emphasizing mass, maneuver, and firepower, to defeat the enemy’s similarly-equipped 
and uniformed armed forces in order to achieve a decisive victory. However, if an 
adversary realizes it has to engage a strong nation-state in combat but knows it cannot 
compete against his superior capabilities in force-on-force battles, it will most assuredly 
look for another method in which to defeat its goliathan adversary.  
C. IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Irregular warfare is utilized by disadvantaged nation-states or non-state actors to 
counter the capabilities and advantages of more powerful militaries.53 Interestingly, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 
1, explains that IW has recently emerged as a major and more pervasive form of warfare; 
however, it is not historical,54 and yet the Department of Defense IW Joint Operating 
Concept, version 1.0 (IWJOC), explains that the U.S. Army, from its infancy up until the 
early twentieth century, focused primarily on irregular warfare against the native tribes of 
North America, “only in the past 100 years has European-style warfighting become the 
U.S. military tradition.”55 Therefore, even within the U.S. Department of Defense, there 
is disagreement on the definition and employment of IW as a term.  
                                                 
52 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3.0, Unified Land Operations 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 7. 
53 Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–6. 
54 Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1, I–6. 
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The most current military doctrine defines irregular warfare as “[a] violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may 
employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s 
power, influence, and will.”56 The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IWJOC) 
stresses irregular warfare is about people, not platforms; advanced technology, 
equipment, and weapons systems alone cannot achieve victory.57 Therefore, 
understanding the relevant population in order to gain their support is critical.58 The 
population is the critical focus in irregular warfare; gaining or maintaining control, 
influence over, and support of that relevant population is the strategic purpose.59 IW is 
ultimately a contest for the legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. The 
population is therefore both the battleground and the object of the conflict.60 
IWJOC version 2.0 identifies five principal operations and activities of IW that 
are undertaken “in sequence, in parallel, or blended”61 to counter irregular threats: 
counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), 
counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO).62 Each activity focuses on 
different but overlapping aspects of the IW operating environment: the host nation’s 
government, its security forces, the populace, economy, and, of course, the enemy. The 
activities are frequently confused or used interchangeably due to their “non-traditional” 
approach to waging war and combating adversaries. Most recently, COIN has received 
significant attention due to its emphasis in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Principles 
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and characteristics of COIN, and its four sister components of IW, will be utilized in this 
thesis to address and highlight key characteristics of irregular warfare.  
The Department of the Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 COIN Operations establishes COIN 
doctrine for the U.S. military.  COIN is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.”63 COIN 
operations are undertaken to defeat a growing insurgency, defined as “the organized use 
of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force 
change of a governing authority.”64 Each side in a COIN conflict attempts to influence 
the populace to accept its authority as legitimate to achieve, or maintain, political 
power.65 Success in COIN requires a long-term strategy that eliminates the cause of the 
insurgency, not just killing the insurgents. To do this effectively, COIN must incorporate 
all aspects of national power: political, military, economic, social, information, and 
infrastructure; military operations alone cannot achieve success in COIN.66 “Victory is 
achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively 
and passively supporting the insurgency, not when the insurgency is defeated 
militarily.”67  
Obtaining the population’s consent requires providing security while at the same 
time maintaining essential services. To accomplish this, counterinsurgent forces must 
understand the local population’s culture and the problems they face, and also incorporate 
their military efforts in conjunction with all instruments of national power. Political, 
social, and economic programs are often more effective than conventional military 
operations in addressing the root cause of the conflict and eventually undermining the 
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insurgency, gaining the support of the populace and, ultimately, their support of the 
legitimacy of the host nation government. As Bernard Fall explains in “The Theory and 
Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in 1965, when the United States was just 
beginning its long military involvement in North and South Vietnam, the military 
problem in an insurgency is secondary, the primary issues are political, ideological, and 
administrative.68 
These points are further developed by David Galula, in his book 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, in which he categorizes 
counterinsurgency and insurgency as forms of revolutionary war, or internal conflicts 
with the aim of seizing power and the government’s attempt to retain control of the state. 
Galula explains that there is a significant asymmetry in revolutionary war between the 
two opposing forces that stems from the disproportion of strength between the state and 
the insurgent. Initially the state has the overwhelming superiority of tangible assets in the 
conflict: an established government, diplomatic recognition, legitimate power in the 
executive, judicial, and legislative branches, control of the administration and police, 
financial resources, industrial and agricultural resources, transportation and 
communication facilities, use and control of information and propaganda media, and 
command of the armed forces and the possibility of increasing their size.69  
However, the situation is reversed when it comes to the intangibles in a 
revolutionary war. The insurgent has a formidable intangible asset—the power of a cause. 
The counterinsurgent, on the other hand, has a heavy liability, fighting the insurgent’s 
cause; he is responsible for maintaining or regaining order throughout the country. The 
insurgent strives to convert his intangible assets to concrete ones while the 
counterinsurgent strives to prevent his intangible liability from diminishing his superior 
concrete assets. The insurgency must grow from small to large and weak to strong in 
order to defeat the COIN forces while the counterinsurgency’s strength increases or  
 
                                                 
68 Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” The Naval War 
College Review (Winter, 1998): 47. 
69 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice—Theory and Practice (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Security International, 1964), 3. 
 19 
decreases depending upon whether or not the insurgent can convert his intangible assets 
to tangible.70 This initial asymmetry makes insurgency markedly different from 
conventional warfare. 
Due to the extreme disadvantage the insurgency has in physical strength and force 
compared to the counterinsurgent force, “[l]ogic forces him instead to carry the fight to a 
different ground where he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against 
him.”71 This new ground becomes the populace. If the insurgency can effectively 
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its 
active support, it will win.  Galula states, “[I]n the final analysis, the exercise of political 
power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its 
submissiveness.”72 The battle for the population is therefore a major characteristic of 
irregular warfare. This battle for the population and initial asymmetries between 
insurgents and the state result in two additional unique characteristics of irregular 
warfare: a long-term commitment, and small unit tactics conducted in an asymmetric-
noncontiguous operating environment.  
Since military solutions alone cannot prevail in irregular warfare, and 
incorporating all aspects of national power is required to “win the battle for the 
population,” irregular warfare strategies require a long-term approach. Successfully 
implementing and executing a strategy that will ultimately gain the population’s support 
takes time; victory, unfortunately, is not quick and decisive. This is supported by Max 
Boot’s analysis that the average insurgency since 1775 has lasted seven years and since 
1945 the time has grown to 10 years.73  
In addition to implementing an overall long-term strategy to garner the 
population’s support, the weaker adversary takes a long-term approach to defeating his 
enemy militarily due to the lopsided military powers of the belligerents in irregular 
warfare.  Countering a superior force is accomplished by avoiding the enemy’s military 
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strengths.  Instead of engaging in massive force-on-force battles, the weaker adversary 
attempts to attrite his stronger adversary over the long-term. Mao Zedong summarizes, 
“[o]ppose protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, and uphold the strategy 
of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision.”74  This protracted war strategy 
utilizes small, mobile military units that conduct hit and run engagements, nibbling at the 
enemy’s heels. Mao further asserts, “[t]he enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, 
we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.”75 T. E. Lawrence, 
another irregular warfare expert, refers to this concept as a “war of detachment,”76 in 
which the strategic aim is to “seek its [the enemy’s] weakest link, and bear only on that 
till time made the mass of it fall.”77 This strategy requires tactics emanating from “… a 
highly mobile, highly equipped typed force, of the smallest size…”78 These smaller units 
operate without fixed battle lines, do not wear military uniforms, and consequently, blend 
into the very populace that both belligerents are trying to influence. Consequently, 
irregular warfare is extremely fluid in nature, waged in an environment absent of fixed 
battle lines, and over a protracted period of time.  
These tactics and strategies define the unique characteristics of irregular warfare.  
They are demonstrated in numerous conflicts throughout the United States’ history, from 
the American Revolutionary War, where the Continental Army and state militias 
conducted what is now referred to as guerrilla warfare tactics against the British, to 
Vietnam where the North Vietnamese and Vietcong used similar tactics against U.S. 
Forces, to present day conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although few wars, if any, have 
strictly utilized only one form of warfare, one type tends to become dominant over the 
other during different phases of a conflict. Consequently, it is imperative to understand 
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the main differences between each form of warfare to effectively identify which form has 
become the dominating way of fighting during various phases of a conflict.   
D. COMPARING THE TWO FORMS 
The key difference between the two forms of warfare thus becomes their focus.  
Traditional warfare focuses on defeating the adversary’s military through force-on-force 
engagements, and seizing or retaining territory, in order to influence the opposing 
government, and doing it as rapidly as possible, while irregular warfare focuses on 
controlling, influencing, or gaining the support of the relevant population over a longer 
time frame. This different focus is what makes IW “irregular.”79 Each form of warfare’s 
focus, consequently, lies on the two opposite ends of the warfare spectrum; the decision 
to use traditional warfare (emphasizing mass, maneuver, and firepower, to defeat the 
other opponent’s military), or a protracted irregular warfare approach, which calls on all 
aspects of national power to eliminate core grievances of the relevant populace, while 
avoiding main force-on-force battle. These two different foci result in two radically 
opposing strategies. Matching the correct strategy to the environment and nature of the 
conflict determines victory or failure.  
E. IVAN ARREGUÍN-TOFT’S STRATEGIC INTERACTION THEORY: 
“HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS” 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft published “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of 
Asymmetric Conflict,” in the summer of 2001, just prior to the September 11 attacks.80  
His theory played out in the following 12 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arreguín-Toft 
analyzes how a weak actor’s strategy in war can make a strong actor’s seemingly 
overwhelming power advantage irrelevant. He begins with a simple statement, “if power 
implies victory in war, then weak actors should almost never win against stronger 
opponents…Yet history suggests otherwise.”81 Arreguín-Toft’s initial data analysis of a 
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200-year period identifies that weak actors defeated their stronger adversary in nearly 30 
percent of all asymmetric conflicts, and the trend is only increasing.82 He attempts to 
determine how this happens for two main reasons: first, to reduce the chances of 
unwinnable wars and increase the likelihood of the United States’ success in future 
asymmetric conflicts; and second, because asymmetric conflicts are the most likely 
security threats the United States will face in the future.83 Arreguín-Toft proposes his 
“strategic interaction” thesis to explain and predict the conditions under which weak 
actors win asymmetric conflicts against stronger adversaries.  
Strategic interaction theory proposes that the dynamic and iterative interaction of 
actors’ strategies during a conflict predicts the outcome.84 Arreguín-Toft identifies two 
ideal-type attack strategies utilized by strong actors, direct attack and barbarism; and two 
ideal-type defense strategies utilized by weak actors, direct defense and guerrilla warfare 
strategy as “a useful starting point for analysis.”85  
Direct attack is defined as “the use of the military to capture or eliminate an 
adversary’s armed forces, thereby gaining control of the opponent’s values.”86 The most 
common form of direct attack is the use of a belligerent’s armed forces advancing against 
an opponent’s strategic assets; the goal of a direct attack strategy is to destroy the 
enemy’s military capability.87 Barbarism targets non-combatants to destroy an 
adversary’s will to fight, not its military capability. Arreguín-Toft defines barbarism as 
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objective.”88 The most common forms of barbarism historically have been the murder of 
non-combatants, the use of concentration camps, and strategic bombing against non-
military targets.89  
The first form of Arreguín-Toft’s weak actor defense strategies is the direct 
defense defined as the “use of armed forces to thwart an adversary’s attempt to capture or 
destroy values such as territory, population, and strategic resources.”90 This strategy, like 
the direct attack, focuses on destroying the adversary’s military capability by crippling its 
advancing armed forces; however, the ways and means are defensive.91 The second form 
of weak actor defense strategies, and the last form of Arreguín-Toft’s four ideal-
strategies, is guerrilla warfare, defined as “the organization of a portion of society for the 
purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct 
confrontation.”92 The goal in guerrilla warfare is not to destroy the adversary’s military 
capabilities but its will. Arreguín-Toft stresses the most important cost a weak actor can 
impose on an adversary is time,93 consequently, guerrilla warfare strategy is not used for 
a quick and decisive win against an invading army.94  
Based upon these four ideal-strategies used by weak and strong actors, Arreguín-
Toft explains strategies and counter-strategies fall into two main categories, a direct 
approach, and an indirect approach. Direct approach strategies, consisting of the direct 
attack and the direct defense, target an enemy’s armed forces with the focus on 
destroying their capability to fight. Indirect approaches do not target the enemy’s armed 
forces or their capabilities but focus instead on destroying the adversaries will to fight. To 
this end, barbarism and guerrilla warfare fall into the indirect approach strategy.   
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Expanding on Mao Zedong’s maxim that “defeat is the invariable outcome where 
native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on the latter’s 
terms,”95 Arreguín-Toft theorizes that when the weak fight the strong, the specific 
interactions of some strategies will favor the weak, while others will favor the strong.96 
Consequently he develops, what he calls, “same-approach” interactions (direct strategy 
versus direct strategy or indirect strategy versus indirect strategy), and “opposite-
approach” interactions (direct versus indirect, or indirect versus direct). He argues that 
conflicts in which the same-approach interaction occur favor the strong actor and result in 
the likely defeat of the weak actor because there is nothing to deflect or mitigate the 
strong actor’s overwhelming military power.97 Conversely, conflicts in which opposite-
approach interactions are predominantly utilized result in weak actors achieving victory 
because the strong actors’ power advantage can be deflected or dodged.98  
Defeat of a strong actor in an opposite-approach strategy occurs mainly for two 
reasons. First, strong actors, due to their overwhelming power advantage, expect to 
achieve a rapid victory. When the weak adversary employs an indirect approach, it draws 
out the conflict; the longer the conflict lasts, the stronger actor risks appearing more and 
more incompetent. This leads to domestic pressure at home and political vulnerability 
that result in the strong actor abandoning the conflict regardless of the military situation 
on the ground.99 Secondly, strong actors lose in opposite-approach conflicts when they 
succumb to barbarism strategies due to increasing frustration from not attaining a quick 
and decisive victory. This also leads to not only political, and domestic, but also 
international condemnation and may potentially result in the strong actor abandoning the 
war effort.100 
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Given Arreguín-Toft’s two strategic approach strategies and resulting strategy-
counter-strategy scenarios, he proposes five hypotheses: 1) When strong actors attack 
using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things 
being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively. 2) When strong actors 
attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other 
things being equal, weak actors should win. 3) When strong actors attack using an 
indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being 
equal, strong actors should lose. 4) When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak 
actors defending with a guerilla warfare strategy, all other things being equal, strong 
actors should win because the weak actors are unable to deflect the strong actors’ power 
advantage. 5) Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose 
opposite-approach interactions.101  
Analyzing the four possible strategy-counterstrategy scenarios between weak and 
strong actors and determining the strategic interaction scenario and the conflict outcome, 
Arreguín-Toft analyzes three key relationships: 1) strategic interaction and conflict 
outcome, 2) strategic interaction and conflict duration, and 3) strategic interaction and the 
trend toward increasing strong-actor failure over time.102  After running regressions on 
197 asymmetric conflicts between 1809 and 1996, in which the strategic interaction 
variable was coded 0 if it was a same approach conflict, and 1 if it was an opposite 
approach conflict; and the conflict outcome variable was coded 0 if the strong actor lost, 
and 1 if the strong actor won; the analysis determined strategic interaction and 
asymmetric conflict outcomes were associated and that the relationship between the two 
was statistically significant.103 The results determined strong actors won 76 percent of all 
same-approach conflicts and weak actors won 63 percent of all opposite-approach 
conflicts. Additionally, same-approach interactions favoring strong actors were shorter in 
duration than opposite-approach interaction, 2.69 years on average for the former, and 
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4.86 years on average for the latter (2.98 years overall mean).104 Regarding weak actor 
defeating strong actor trends, Arreguín-Toft’s data analysis demonstrated that opposite-
approach conflicts and strong-actor failures have increased over time. From 1800 to 
1899, only 5.9 percent of asymmetric conflicts analyzed were opposite-approach 
interactions; 10.1 percent from 1850 to 1899, 16.1 percent from 1900 to 1949, and 
finally, 22.2 percent from 1950 to 1998.  
The conflict outcome, conflict duration, and strategy-interaction analysis support 
three key findings: 1) strong actors are more likely to lose opposite-approach conflicts; 2) 
opposite-approach conflicts last longer than same-approach conflicts, and; 3) the 
frequency of opposite-approach interactions has increased proportionally to strong actor 
failure over time.105  
In summary, Arrguine-Toft’s analysis suggests that strong actors lose conflicts 
against weaker adversaries when the weak employ an opposite-approach strategy. 
Opposite approach strategies work against strong actors because the weaker adversary is 
able to sacrifice values for time; this drawn-out conflict timeline results in the eventual 
capitulation of the stronger adversary.106 Same-approach strategies, however, favor 
strong actors because both sides share the same costs, values, and victory conditions. The 
weak actor cannot compete against the stronger actor’s advantage in relative power.  
Although Arreguíne-Toft’s strategic interaction model provides a useful basis of 
analysis to compare weak and strong actors’ strategic interactions in asymmetric conflict, 
it is not without its limits. First, Arreguín-Toft’s interaction model oversimplifies conflict 
interactions by neglecting to take into account variables other than military strategies that 
may impact conflict outcomes. Simply put, victory is not solely dependent upon on an 
actor’s military strategy, especially in asymmetric conflicts. Second, each actor’s strategy 
is not randomly chosen; however, Arreguín-Toft does not explain why actors choose 
specific strategies or fail to change strategies when one is not working. As Michael A. 
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Jensen explains in International Studies Review, “Arreguín-Toft offers little explanation 
for why actors adopt particular strategies, or why they often switch to suboptimal 
strategies during the course of the war.”107 The strategic approach of an actor in relation 
to his adversary is the deciding factor on who achieves victory; therefore why a strategy 
is chosen or not chosen should be addressed. This thesis aims to provide some insight 
into this point in particular.  Lastly, the use of the terms barbarism and guerrilla warfare 
for both actors’ indirect approach strategies is misleading. Both terms imply utilizing 
military force as the only method of achieving victory in asymmetric conflicts. However, 
this thesis will assert that a true indirect approach positively engages and works through 
the population to defeat the adversary. Finally, as Timothy Richards explains in Small 
Wars Journal, the strategies are not unique to each respective actor.  Barbaric tactics, 
such as terrorism, are often utilized by weak actors while guerrilla warfare can also be 
waged by strong actors.108  
Although Arreguín-Toft’s theory attempts to define why power does not simply 
equate to victory, all four ideal-strategies are based upon the use of force. Due to these 
issues, this thesis also aims to test Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction model to 
determine if it adequately explains the strategy-counterstrategy dynamic within the 
specific cases studied, where the United States was a weak actor in one, and the strong 
actor in the other.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The next chapters will explore two case studies of U.S. wars—the American 
Revolutionary War and the Vietnam conflict. In both wars, the United States initially 
adopted counterintuitive approaches: in the Revolutionary War, the U.S. colonies were 
the weak actor but initially attempted to fight a traditional large-scale war. In the Vietnam 
conflict, the United States was the stronger actor, but initially used an indirect strategy. 
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Each of these case studies will dissect which strategy, direct or indirect, the United States 
implemented throughout the war, and consequently, whether it was the correct strategic 
interaction at that time. Each case will analyze the conditions under which traditional war 
was chosen to investigate which of the three hypotheses proposed in Chapter I, the Unites 
States’ military industrial complex, a “might is right” attitude, or a hierarchical 
authoritative command structure, explains the decision to use traditional tactics and 







III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From April 19, 1775 when the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord, 
until the final salvos were fired at Yorktown on October 17, 1781, the American 
Revolution was a war for public opinion. Both countries’ leadership realized this. Prior to 
the battle of Trenton in December of 1776, Washington wrote that one of the reasons for 
attacking the British was to, “…at least give our Affairs such a turn as to make ‘em 
assume a more promising aspect.”109  Lord Germain, the British Secretary of State, wrote 
after the same battle that it was not the loss of men that mattered, but the effect on French 
and American opinion.110  
Throughout the war, both armies’ strategies would change and evolve but 
ultimately it became a strategy of attrition by the weaker Continental army against a 
strategy of annihilation by the British army. Although multiple strategies were employed 
throughout the Revolutionary War by both actors, the American colonies primarily 
implemented a war of attrition commanded by General Washington.  The military 
theorist Hans Delbrück refers to this type of approach as a “bipolar strategy” by where 
“…the general decides from moment to moment whether he is to achieve his goal by 
battle or by maneuver, so that his decisions vary constantly, so to speak, between the two 
poles or maneuver and battle…”111 Drawing from Arreguín-Toft, Washington’s attrition 
strategy, even though he ultimately sought to defeat the British in decisive battle, 
translated into an indirect approach strategy employed by a weaker actor against a direct 
approach strategy employed by an overwhelmingly stronger actor that led to the 
American colonies’ victory. Despite the colonies’ success in using the indirect approach 
against their stronger adversary, Washington still longed for a direct and decisive military  
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engagement with the British. This is most likely due his desire to see a quick end to the 
conflict instead of testing the resolve and will of the populace via a protracted irregular 
form of warfare. 
B. BACKGROUND TO THE WAR 
The origins of the Revolutionary War have its roots in Britain’s victory in the 
French and Indian war fought in the American Colonies from 1754 through 1763.112 
British patriotism and the importance it placed on the colonies were at an all-time high 
after the war. At the same time, however, the victory increased the colonists’ confidence 
and status vis-à-vis the British Empire. This newfound confidence resulted in increasing 
British oversight and policies enacted to exact revenue and tighten its grip on the 
colonies. These growing tensions came to a head on April 19, 1775 when over 2,000 
British Regulars and over 1,000 American colonists clashed at Lexington and 
Concord.113 At the end of the day 65 British soldiers and 49 American colonists lay 
dead.114 As a result of the “shot heard around the world” at Lexington, what was initially 
an argument about the relationship between the American colonies and England became a 
full-fledged civil war.  
From the battle of Bunker Hill, where the British took control of Boston, the 
occupation of Rhode Island by General Clinton, the battle for New Jersey and resulting 
Forage Wars lasting through 1777, the campaign to control the Hudson Valley and the 
battle for Philadelphia in 1778, and finally the campaign for the southern colonies from 
1778 to 1781 that led to the checkmate at Yorktown, it is nearly impossible to highlight 
one specific turning point in the war. However, if it were not for George Washington’s 
decision to wage an indirect war against the strongest military power in the world, the 
conflict would have only lasted as long as the British initially thought it would, a few 
short months, before the American “rebels” gave up their cause for liberty and 
capitulated. Instead, George Washington’s war of detachment and innate ability to retreat 
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and attack in order to build and sustain public support for the war, forced the British 
public to turn against it, referring to America as “the graveyard of Englishmen.”115 In 
order to better understand the conditions under which Washington executed a war of 
detachment, it is necessary to highlight both sides’ strategies in the war.  
1. American Strategies 
Following the British defeat at Lexington and Concord in 1775, one of the 
colonies’ main priorities was to appoint a commander-in-chief to lead their newly formed 
army. The Second Continental Congress wanted a commander-in-chief that would unite 
the colonies, and garner necessary public support for the cause and keep the war effort 
going.  
George Washington was chosen because he professed a lack of interest in the job 
while, at the same time, was a familiar name to everyone in the Colonies, not as a 
Virginian, but as a frontiersman who often spoke of the need to unite all the colonies.116 
John Adams described him as, “a Gentleman from Virginia who was among Us and very 
well known to all of Us, a Gentleman whose Skill and Experience as an Officer, whose 
independent fortune, great Talents and excellent universal Character, would command the 
Approbation of all America, and unite the cordial Exertions of all the Colonies better than 
any other person in the Union.”117  
Washington and his generals contemplated several strategies for winning the war. 
One strategy was to wage a maritime and economic war on Britain through the use of 
privateers, privately owned merchant ships authorized to attack foreign vessels. Although 
this course of action resulted in millions of pounds captured from British merchants, it 
had little impact on the leaders in England or on British public opinion.118 A second 
course of action, proposed by General Horatio Gates, consisted of avoiding decisive 
battles, and instead retreating to the interior of the colonies, and wearing down the British 
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Regulars through attrition.119 This strategy, at the time, did not gain any traction with the 
politicians and the public who, like Washington, hoped for a short conflict that would 
avoid testing the resolve of the colonists and soldiers over the long term.120 General 
Charles Lee proposed a third strategy. He also wanted to avoid major battles but instead 
of retreating he suggested persistently attacking the stronger British adversary with 
smaller, highly mobile forces under independent commands.121 A fourth strategy, 
favored by Washington, was a defensive strategy in which the British army would be 
forced to attack strong defensive positions; however, this strategy, called a “war of posts” 
required a cooperative adversary.122 A fifth strategy was one of a perimeter defense that 
entailed defending all of the towns in the colonies. Militarily this was impossible given 
the limited numbers of troops.123 Ultimately, Washington’s strategy focused on 
preventing Britain from capturing or defeating the Continental Army. “If the army could 
be kept alive, the Revolutionary cause would also remain alive.”124  
Although Washington sought to maintain support for the cause and his army by 
waging a protracted war, he always yearned for a professional, well-trained army that 
could fight a force-on-force decisive battle.125 According to David Fischer in 
Washington’s Crossing, Washington learned a creed from an early age that valued self-
government, discipline, virtue, reason, and restraint. It consisted of a philosophy that 
combined honor as a virtue, power with responsibility, and liberty with discipline. 
Fischer explains that the only fear Washington ever acknowledged in his life was that his 
actions would “reflect eternal dishonour upon me.”126 Even as a young 23-year old 
colonel fighting in the French and Indian War, Washington had an intense concern for 
order and discipline among his soldiers. Washington wrote to his captains in 1757 that 
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“[d]iscipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success 
to the weak, and esteem to all.”127 He wrote to the Virginia governor complaining of 
insolent soldiers and indolent officers, demanded more rigorous military laws and tried to 
organize a First Virginia Regiment after British Regulars.128  
This was the same unstructured, undisciplined environment Washington 
encountered when he arrived in Cambridge on July 2, 1775. He was appalled by the New 
England soldiers and wrote, “[t]he officers generally speaking are the most indifferent 
kind of people I ever saw. They are an exceeding dirty and nasty people.”129 Washington 
was not sure how he would be able to lead this amateur army against the professional and 
well-trained British Regulars. “[L]icentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly 
reign,” he wrote. “The little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army, is in 
a manner done away by having such a mixture of troops.”130  
Washington’s strategy was consequently founded upon a strategic paradox. He 
had to completely vanquish the British military to win independence from England, but at 
the same time, his inferior army could not possibly wage an effective direct offensive 
campaign against them. However, if he could conduct a protracted war in which Great 
Britain would lose interest in the war over time, Washington could compel their 
withdrawal. Washington also realized he risked losing the American colonies’ support if 
the war lasted too long.131 He had to balance these two demands. In the contest for public 
opinion, if Washington could keep his Continental Army intact, and give the colonists, 
and the world, the perception that it was able to stand up against the powerful British 
army, he could wage an indirect, prolonged war, and turn British public opinion against 
it.  
Another factor that led Washington to want direct, conventional confrontation on 
the battlefield over an indirect protracted war was his own concerns about the Continental 
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Army and the colonies’ vacillating support. Washington recognized the Revolutionary 
War was a struggle for the legitimacy and influence over the population. Understanding 
this, he utilized both direct and indirect means to erode his adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.  
2. British Strategies 
At the start of the American Revolutionary War, two-thirds of the British Army 
and one half of its Royal Navy were dispatched to the colonies132 to “end the rebellion 
and restore the American Colonies to their allegiance.”133 In addition, England paid over 
20,000 Hessian troops to reinforce the British army and squash the rebellion.134 General 
William Howe along with his brother Admiral Richard Howe, commander of the Royal 
British Navy in the American Revolution, were charged with restoring the British Empire 
in America by peace if possible, and war if necessary.135  
When the Howes arrived in New York in the spring of 1775, they had many 
strategies in which to consider and employ in order to accomplish their mission. The first 
strategy proposed was a naval blockade of the colonies. Since a large part of the colonies’ 
per capita income came from foreign trade, and the colonies needed foreign trade to wage 
war, many British leaders thought a naval blockade would be the most effective strategy 
to subdue the continent. Admiral Howe noted, however, that a complete blockade of the 
colonial coastline was impossible with the amount of resources the British had dedicated 
elsewhere protecting the English Empire.136  
A second strategy proposed, called Shrecklichkeit (German for terror), 
emphasized a deliberate and extreme use of violence to break the colonists’ will to resist. 
General Howe, however, thought such conduct was ultimately unwise and ineffective. 
Despite this, many British and Hessian soldiers employed this strategy throughout the 
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war, which did more to rally the colonists around the cause of liberty and to support 
George Washington’s Continental Army and partisan efforts than it did to break their 
will.137 
A third strategy, championed by General Henry Clinton, was to relentlessly seek 
out, pursue, and destroy the Continental Army. However, Howe felt that the Continental 
Forces were too elusive of an adversary, appearing and melting away into the population 
at will. Howe wrote to England in the spring of 1776 expressing his concern, “...knowing 
the advantages, in having the whole country, as it were, at their disposal, they will not 
readily be brought into a situation where the King’s troops can meet them upon equal 
terms. Their armies retiring a few miles back from the navigable rivers, ours cannot 
follow them from the difficulties I expect to meet with in procuring land carriage.”138 
Another proposed strategy, today referred to as the inkblot or oil stain strategy, 
consisted of controlling small strategic areas in the colonies and expanding them until all 
the colonies became secure. However, over 95 percent of the American colonies’ 
population lived outside major cities; essentially America was “a culture without a 
capital.”139 Secondly, the inkblot strategy would take time and require a significant 
increase in the amount of soldiers, both of which England was unwilling to commit. 
Instead, the Howes supported a variation of this strategy, which included seizing and 
holding major corridors and river lines, particularly the Hudson River in New York. If the 
British could capture and secure the Hudson River, they would be able to separate and 
isolate New England from the rest of the colonies and therefore strangle the revolt.140 
The last plan proposed by the British offered support for the colonists that were still loyal 
to England. The Howes supported this strategy, siding with General James Robertson, 
who wrote, “I never had an idea of subduing the Americans. I meant to assist the good 
Americans to subdue the bad.”141 
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From these strategies the Howe brothers proposed an increase in forces and, 
together with the Royal Navy, would seize New York, making it a major base of 
operations. They would also send a smaller force to Canada that would move south and 
together, the two forces, would take control of the Hudson Valley.142 After controlling 
the Hudson Valley and New York, General Howe believed he would be able to leave a 
small contingent in New York City to keep it secure while he moved in two directions to 
seize Rhode Island and New Jersey. He would then occupy three colonies and would 
offer the Loyalists in each of the colonies protection and the colonists who were 
moderates concessions. In this way he would sway public opinion in his favor, and one 
by one, bring all of the colonies back under England’s control. General Howe believed 
the key to this strategy, and consequently winning the war, was speed and maneuver. He 
wrote, “The army at the opening of the campaign, being in force, would probably by 
rapid movements bring the rebels to an action upon equal terms, before they could cover 
themselves by works of any significance.”143 
Despite containing both direct and indirect methods, the British strategy for 
subduing the American Colonies relied primarily on traditional warfare, as defined by 
today’s current doctrine, focusing on defeating the adversary’s military through force on 
force engagements, and seizing or retaining territory to ultimately influence the opposing 
government’s beliefs. England employed a direct approach strategy, via the direct attack 
and even the direct defense at times, to capture or eliminate its opponent’s armed forces 
in order to regain control of its values via the use of overwhelming military force.  
C. KEY BATTLES  
Each Revolutionary War campaign, and battles within those campaigns, 
demonstrates an interesting combination of the evolution of, or persistence in, the 
strategies employed by both the British and the American forces. However, the Siege of 
Boston, and the campaigns for the control of New York, New Jersey, the Hudson Valley, 
and the Southern Colonies, directly led to the final battle of the Revolutionary War, the 
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Battle of Yorktown. For this reason, these campaigns are useful for exploring the 
strategic dynamic between the British and Colonial forces and ultimately how a weaker 
actor, General Washington and his Continental Army, was able to defeat a much stronger 
actor, the powerful English Army and Royal Navy. , was able to defeat a much stronger 
actor, the powerful English Army and Royal Navy. Even though the Continental Army 
engaged in and lost several conventional battles throughout the war, these campaigns 
show that the Colonial forces succeeded because they were able to stave off catastrophic 
defeat, which enabled them to wear down their stronger adversary overtime until public 
opinion in England turned against the war. The Battle of Yorktown, a direct confrontation 
between the Continental Army and the British, was possible only after years of draining-
indirect confrontations wore down British will, and French reinforcements strengthened 
the colonials.   
George Washington and General William Howe faced off at the siege of Boston 
in June of 1775. However, as Washington and his newly formed army persisted in the 
siege, Howe decided to abandon the city, deciding to resume the war against the 
Continental Army on conditions that were more favorable than the narrow Boston 
peninsula.144 Howe was the commander of the British forces at Bunker Hill two months 
earlier. Although the British won the battle, the colonists entrenched in defensive fighting 
positions around Bunker Hill, successfully repulsed the first two British frontal assaults, 
resulting in the loss of 1,150 soldiers, 40 percent of Howe’s force, compared to 441 
American casualties.145  
The outcome of Bunker Hill had a profound impact on both armies. It initially 
confirmed to the Americans that they could effectively fight a strategic defensive war to 
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The painful victory at Bunker Hill made General Howe reluctant to conduct a frontal 
assault against Continental Army fortified defensive positions for the remainder of the 
war.147  
1. The Battle for New York  
Once the British withdrew from Boston, General Washington knew their next 
objective would be New York.148 Washington hoped his army would be able to conduct a 
similar defensive operation around New York City like it did at Bunker Hill. However, 
Howe effectively and repeatedly flanked the Continental Army’s defensive positions first 
on Long Island and again on Manhattan. The Americans retreated to their final defensive 
position of New York at Fort Washington. On November 16, 1776, General Howe 
launched an all-out attack on the fort and by the end of the day more than 2,800 
American troops had perished or were captured. This crushing defeat changed the way 
Nathanael Greene chose to fight the British army, he wrote, “I feel mad, vexed, sick and 
sorry…This is the most terrible event: its consequences are justly to be dreaded.”149 
General Greene would later command the armies and militias in the southern colonies 
using irregular warfare tactics, completely opposite to what he implemented on Long 
Island and Manhattan.  
Like Greene, Washington was profoundly affected by the lopsided defeat in New 
York; he realized he had to match his strategy with the capability of his soldiers.150 
Washington explained in his written correspondence to Congress that it would be in error 
“to lead our young troops into the open ground against their superiors, both in number 
and discipline…I have not found the readiness to defend even strong posts at all hazards. 
The honor of making a brave defense does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the 
success is very doubtful, and the falling into the enemy’s hands probable.”151 Through 
this experience, General Washington developed his indirect strategy, writing “we should 
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on all occasions avoid a general action or put anything to the risque unless compelled by 
necessity.”152 Consequently, Washington came to terms with a strategy of a “retreating 
army” defending what it could, yielding what it must, and looking for an opportunity 
“when a brilliant stroke could be made with any probability of success.”153 This indirect 
approach became the cornerstone of subsequent battles.  
The first confrontation between General Washington as commanded-in-chief of 
the continental army at the Siege of Boston and the Battle of New York was a strategy 
between Washington’s weaker forces and General Howe’s stronger army and navy. 
Learning the devastating lessons of Bunker Hill, the British military refused conduct a 
frontal assault against fixed American defensive positions. General Washington’s 
untrained and undisciplined army was unable to disrupt the disciplined British military’s 
ability to use overwhelming mass and maneuver.  As a result, Washington’s direct 
defense approach against General Howe’s direct attack approach failed miserably. If he 
had not executed a remarkable escape, General Washington may very well have lost the 
war in November of 1776.  
2. The Battle for New Jersey: Roles Reversed 
Having taken New York, General Howe aimed to seize New Jersey, while his 
brother took control of Rhode Island.154 General Howe planned to establish posts 
throughout New Jersey while at the same use the farms and forests to resupply his army 
before the winter set in. Simultaneously his brother would move by sea with General 
Clinton commanding the land forces and seize Rhode Island.  In this way England would 
have control of three colonies by the end of the year, New York, Rhode Island, and New 
Jersey; they believed the rebellion would not last through the winter.155  
One of the major lessons General Washington learned from his loss in New York 
was the importance of having good intelligence. General Howe was able to utilize the 
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overwhelming numbers, skill, and professionalism of the Royal Navy to conceal and 
deceive the American forces as to where his invasion forces would land. However, as the 
British won more ground and occupied more territory, Washington began to develop 
networks of informants throughout the local populace that continually updated him on the 
whereabouts and movements of the British and Hessian forces.156  Using the intelligence 
he obtained from the local populace, instead of using a typical eighteen century strong 
point defense, Washington focused his strategy on quick raids and attacks against British 
detachments and outposts.157 Attacking at the periphery of the British army was the only 
strategy that his untrained and undisciplined army could execute at this stage of the 
war.158  
Howe’s 1776 war of outposts in New Jersey played perfectly into Washington’s 
strategy of quick raids, attacks, and withdrawals. Washington and his army successfully 
retreated across New Jersey, and fearing an overwhelming attack by Cornwallis and his 
army at Trenton, retreated to the western bank of the Delaware River into Pennsylvania 
in early December 1776. Cornwallis’ men reached Trenton on December 8, 1776, and 
ended the New Jersey campaign, and put his men in winter quarters.159 With General 
Clinton’s army successfully occupying Rhode Island on December 7, Washington’s army 
in retreat on the other side of the Delaware, and New York in his control, Howe believed 
that the rebellion, and the war, would soon be over.160  
On December 1, 1176, Washington only had 3,000 soldiers in his army after the 
battles in New York and the retreat across New Jersey.161 Actions by the Hessians and 
British soldiers, however, soon enraged the local populace, helped to recruit more 
colonists, and presented him with an opportunity to go on the offensive. General Howe 
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initially thought that two thirds of the colonists actually supported England.162 As a result 
he believed he could safely spread his soldiers throughout New Jersey as part of his war 
of outposts strategy.163 This was reaffirmed when many Loyalists welcomed them as 
liberators as they entered towns throughout New Jersey.164  
Howe’s dispersion of the British and Hessian outposts contributed to significant 
logistical problems. Many of the provisions used to support the New York and New 
Jersey campaigns were brought by sea 3,000 miles away. By the end of November 
supplies were running low and the quick expected victory that was not achieved resulted 
in additional support requirements.165 Howe ordered his garrisons in New Jersey to 
supply themselves by foraging through the countryside but ordered restraint in doing 
so.166 The local populace soon became enraged at the amount of plundering conducted by 
the Hessian and British soldiers. Foraging turned into pillaging, pillaging turned into 
plundering, and plundering turned into rape and murder on many occasions.167 As the 
violence increased, the New Jersey populace took up arms, and within a few weeks it was 
unsafe for the British and Hessian soldiers to forage or travel throughout the countryside, 
so unsafe that Howe ordered his troops to only travel in large convoys and forbade 
travelling at night. Pennsylvania and New Jersey partisans conducted small unit raids on 
enemy outposts and disappeared into the countryside or sniped at Hessian and British 
soldiers foraging through the woods.168 General Howe realized that he had overestimated 
colonial support for Britain. He told his private secretary, “almost all the People or Parts 
& Spirit were in the Rebellion.”169  
Although Washington did not command or direct the local militia and partisans, 
he was fully aware of their effect on the enemy and the opportunity they presented 
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him.170  Under these conditions, Washington and his army crossed the Delaware River on 
Christmas Eve 1776, and conducted a surprise attack against the Hessian garrison at 
Trenton, New Jersey, using his Continental Army soldiers from the west and north and 
using Pennsylvania and New Jersey militiamen from the south. Over 900 Hessians were 
captured, 22 killed, and 83 seriously wounded.171  
Washington used similar hit-and-run tactics against Cornwallis as he marched his 
men from Princeton to Trenton in January 1777. Washington’s men and partisan forces 
attrited this powerful army along the march by harassing raids and ambushes, 
continuously attacking and retreating.172 Cornwallis’ forces were weakened when they 
finally attacked the American’s defense along the Main Post Road, forcing General 
Cornwallis to retreat. It was such a lopsided victory that an American artillery sergeant 
wrote, “[t]he bridge looked red as blood, with their killed and wounded and red coats.”173 
The second battle of Trenton resulted in an estimated 500 British or Hessian soldiers 
killed, captured, or wounded compared to only 50 American casualties.174  
Washington then used this momentum to conduct a surprise attack on Princeton 
while General Howe was marching his forces toward Trenton for a counter attack. 
Washington used back roads to surprise the remaining British forces at Princeton. 
Following the raid, Washington retreated to Morristown where he waited out the 
remainder of the year, reorganizing and recruiting more soldiers for his Continental 
Army. In the face of local resistance, Cornwallis was forced to consolidate his outpost 
and withdraw into fewer, more fortified positions.  The Hessian officer, Captain Ewald 
wrote, “Thus had the times changed! The Americans had constantly run before us. Four 
weeks ago we expected to end the war with the capture of Philadelphia, and now we had 
to render Washington the honor of thinking about our defense.”175  
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Through these series of raids in New Jersey, George Washington was winning the 
war of public opinion, drawing more soldiers to enlist in his Continental Army, and 
capitalizing on the strength and effectiveness of the local militias and partisans. After the 
victories at Trenton and Princeton Thomas Jefferson wrote, “We have last turned the 
Tables upon these scoundrels by surprise, Could we but get a good Regular Army we 
should soon clear the Continent of these damned invaders.”176 Washington continued to 
use the militias to annoy and harass the enemy at every opportunity and to avoid a 
general engagement in order to keep the enemy on the defensive. 
3. The Hudson Valley Campaign and Loss of Philadelphia 
On June 20, 1770, General Burgoyne, commanding an army of over 8,300 
soldiers, 3,700 British, 3,000 Hessians, 650 Tories and Canadians, and 400 Iroquois 
Indians, with a train of 138 Howitzers and 600 artillerymen, set sail from the northern 
banks of Lake Champlain to secure the Hudson River. His plan was to sweep down Lake 
Champlain, capture Fort Ticonderoga, and push southward to Albany. From Albany he 
would combine forces with Colonel St. Leger’s forces attacking eastward from Lake 
Ontario via the Mohawk River. These two forces would then act as an anvil for General 
Howe’s force to attack northward up the Hudson River from New York and crush the 
American rebels. Under this plan, General Washington would be forced to abandon New 
Jersey to counter the combined British forces, which would lead to his defeat. If General 
Washington chose to stay in New Jersey and not reinforce the Northern Army, the British 
and Hessian forces surmised they would have complete control of the Hudson River and 
effectively strangle the rebellion.177  
On July 6, General Arthur St. Clair, commander of the American forces at Fort 
Ticonderoga, was forced to abandon the fort in the face of overwhelming British artillery. 
However, General Burgoyne’s heavy equipped army could not keep up with its lighter, 
more maneuverable American adversaries and became bogged down in the surrounding  
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forests, which were full of obstacles and colonial partisans. On August 16, an attack by 
John Stark’s 1,500 men of the New Hampshire militia cost Burgoyne over 900 of his 
men.178  
In addition to having forces that were ill prepared for the terrain and partisan 
threats, word spread throughout the area of the atrocities committed against the populace 
by the Indians fighting for Burgoyne. Local resistance increased and swarms of militia 
and partisans continuously harassed Burgoyne’s main forces as they made their way 
through the dense Hudson Valley.179  
By mid-September, Burgoyne’s forces were half depleted, he lacked supplies, and 
were under constant attack from the local militias and partisans. Nevertheless, General 
Burgoyne attacked General Gates’ defensive positions north of Albany at Bemis Heights 
on September 18 and, despite holding the line, sustained devastating losses, suffering 556 
British regulars dead or wounded.180 A second attack at Bemis Heights on October 8 
forced Burgoyne to retreat to Saratoga181 where on October 17, he surrendered to 
General Gates. Over 5,800 British and Hessian soldiers and officers, and 27 field pieces 
were put out of commission.182 
In 1777, Howe made an attempt to seize the Colonies’ capital, Philadelphia. 
Washington again made use of indirect tactics and ordered his troops and the local militia 
to “hang on” to Howe’s troops with harassing attacks.183 Washington’s and Howe’s 
forces met at Brandywine Creek. Howe used a force-on-force confrontation combined 
with a flanking manoeuver that resulted in 89 British killed, and 488 wounded compared 
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to Washington’s army suffering 200 killed, 500 wounded, and 400 captured.184 Howe 
entered the capital on September 26 unopposed, with Congress fleeing the city.185 
The loss of the capital in any other war during that time would have proved 
disastrous to the defending army and nation. However, Philadelphia was not a 
geographical center of gravity. Consequently, the political and economic damage 
inflicted on the colonies and the cause was minimal.186 With the surrender of Burgoyne’s 
army at Saratoga and Washington’s ability to keep the Continental army alive, foreign 
powers were now willing to enter the war on the side of the Americans, and by the 
summer of the following year, July 1778, French soldiers came ashore en masse to help 
the Continental Army. These forces made Washington’s desire for a decisive battle 
finally possible.  
4. The Southern Campaign and Checkmate at Yorktown 
With the war in the northern colonies a stalemate, the British turned their attention 
to the southern colonies where they believed strong Loyalist factions resided. In late 1778 
and early 1779 the British army, under the command of Cornwallis, took control of 
Georgia. Clinton came down from New York on May 12, 1780 and captured Charleston 
along with the whole American army in the south commanded by Major General 
Benjamin Lincoln.187 Within the span of 20 months the British completely wiped out 
three American armies, conquered Savannah and Charleston, occupied a substantial 
portion of South Carolina, and killed, wounded, or captured over 7,000 American 
soldiers.188  However, British and Hessian soldiers’ cruel treatment of the local populace 
enraged the local populace and the southern colonists began to revolt.189  
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As in upper New York and New Jersey, partisan forces began to attack the British 
through hit-and-run tactics. In the Battle of King’s Mountain, over-mountain men with 
Revolutionary partisans from North and South Carolina defeated British and Loyalists 
forces on October 7, 1780, killing Major Patrick Ferguson and 157 of his Loyalists 
fighters, and capturing approximately 800 others.190 This devastating loss to the Loyalists 
effectively put an end to Loyalist support in the south.191  
General Nathanael Greene, now in the South, capitalized on the indirect approach. 
With little more than 1,000 soldiers and militiamen, Greene split his men into three 
groups, one under General Daniel Morgan operating in the western portion of the 
Carolinas, the second under Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee who 
would work with Francis Marion along the coast, and the third under his own command 
in the center.192 Greene reasoned, “It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels 
my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct.”193  
Cornwallis, not wanting to attack just one of Greene’s units and let the other two 
go unopposed, decided to divide his forces as well and focused on General Greene while 
half of his army led by Colonel Tarleton, pursued Daniel Morgan in the west. Morgan, 
who was a superb tactician, allowed Tarleton to draw him into battle at Cowpens, South 
Carolina. With a little over 1,000 men he inflicted a crushing defeat against Tarleton and 
his forces, who lost nine-tenths of his men killed or wounded.194  
Cornwallis decided to pursue General Greene with the aim of drawing him into 
open battle and completely destroying his forces. Like the rest of the British campaigns in 
the Revolutionary War, Cornwallis’s forces had an extensive and burdensome logistical 
train making them slower and less maneuverable than their American adversaries. 
Realizing this, Cornwallis burned his supporting equipment, except what his men could 
carry, in order to pursue General Greene’s more mobile forces. Leveraging the lightness 
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of his forces and their knowledge of the local terrain, General Greene made Cornwallis 
chase him for as long as possible, remaining ahead of Cornwallis’ army through the 
Carolinas to Virginia, depleting his supplies and exhausting his troops.195 Before meeting 
in battle, Cornwallis had lost 500 men out of his initial 2,500 as a result of the frantic 
chase. Greene attacked General Cornwallis’ depleted army at Guilford Courthouse on 
March 15 but still could not overcome Cornwallis’ professional forces in open battle and 
had to abandon the fight. Although Cornwallis won the battle he sustained 532 casualties 
and150 killed.   
Cornwallis retreated to Wilmington and attempted a “war of posts” strategy.196 
However, the British did not have the manpower to establish the amount of posts required 
to secure the countryside, while at the same time the posts they did have were 
undermanned, leaving them vulnerable to attack. Greene’s army and the partisans 
planned to defeat these outposts one by one. Although Greene would incur tactical defeat 
in the following attacks on Camden, Eutaw Springs, and other outposts, the casualties 
that the British suffered forced them to withdraw to a few limited locations in the south. 
This reduced their control in the south to only the immediate vicinities of Wilmington, 
Charleston, and Savannah.197  Greene best explained the reasons for his success in the 
Southern campaign when he stated, “I have been obliged to practice that by finesse which 
I dared not attempt by force. There are few generals that has run oftener, or more lustily 
than I have done…But I have taken care not to run too far, and commonly have run as 
fast backward, to convince our Enemy that we were like a Crab that could run either 
way…We fight, get beat, rise and fight again.”198 
On August 14, 1781 Washington learned that French Admiral DeGrasse was en 
route to Virginia with 29 warships and 3,200 troops but he would not be able to remain 
on the American coast any longer than mid-October.199 Washington wrote in his diary: 
                                                 
195 Weigley, The American Way of War, 31. 
196 Weigley, The American Way of War, 32. 
197 Weigley, The American Way of War, 35. 
198 Weigley, The American Way of War, 36. 
199 Lengel, A Military Life, Loc6696. 
 48 
Matters having now come to a crisis and a decisive plan to be determined 
on, I was obliged …to give up all idea of attacking New York; & instead 
thereof to remove the French Troops & a detachment from the American 
Army to Head of Elk to be transported to Virginia for the purpose of 
cooperating with the force from the West Indies against the Troops in that 
State.200  
Washington’s movement to Yorktown began on August 19. On September 28, 
1781 Washington marched his entire army, the French and Americans, into positions 
forming a six-mile arc around the British entrenchments at Yorktown. It was the most 
powerful army he had ever assembled in the war with 7,800 French soldiers, 3,100 
militiamen, and 8,000 Continentals.201 This overwhelming force compelled General 
Cornwallis to offer a cease-fire. Ultimately, the British still had the forces to fight the 
war, but it was the public’s support they did not have. On February 22, 1782, British 
Parliament voted 234–215 to end the war.202  
D. STRATEGIC INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
Both adversaries in the American Revolution employed Arreguín-Toft’s four 
basic strategies.  The basic ideal strategies for a stronger actor—the direct attack and 
barbarism strategies—were utilized by the stronger British forces. Two ideal strategies 
for a weaker actor, the direct defense and guerrilla warfare, were implemented by the 
American forces. Both adversaries attempted other strategies as well, not conducive to 
their strength such as a direct defense at times for the British and direct attack for the 
Americans. Overall, the American’s employed the combination of strategies with greater 
success and in line with their own resources compared to their adversaries. 
During the battle for New York, General Washington and General Howe both 
implemented a direct approach strategy, with the Continental Army commanded by 
General Washington utilizing a direct defense strategy (which was ideal), and the British 
and Hessian forces, commanded by General Howe, conducting a direct attack strategy 
(also ideal). Both generals were seeking to inflict a devastating defeat on his opponent in 
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order to bring a quick end to the war in the summer of 1776. In accordance with 
Arreguín-Toft’s analysis for same approach interactions, when both are utilized, the 
stronger actor achieves victory because his overpowering advantages cannot be deflected. 
Such was the case with the Battle for New York and the American colonists suffered a 
devastating loss. Because of this same approach strategy-counter strategy, the stronger 
actor won, and the weaker actor, Washington and his Continental Army, realized they 
had to change their strategy. 
From the Fall of 1776 through the Spring of 1777, the battle for New Jersey and 
the Forage Wars saw General Washington drastically revise his strategy from one of a 
failed direct approach, the direct defense, at the battle of New York, to an indirect 
approach strategy that he would utilize for the remainder of the war, until Yorktown, 
where he was able to command a military that was more numerous and more powerful 
than his British adversaries.  Washington realized he had to match his strategy with the 
capability of his soldiers. General Howe on the other hand, continued to implement his 
direct approach strategy in New Jersey utilizing primarily a direct defense strategy via a 
war of outposts. Although he employed a pacification program and offered concessions 
and clemency to Loyalists and moderates, his main focus was on destroying the 
capability of the Continental Army and controlling terrain, both direct approach 
strategies.  
One may argue that the British army conducted an indirect approach strategy by 
resorting to barbarism, attempting to destroy the colonists’ will to resist; however, the 
acts of barbarism were not a unified strategic approach, and most certainly, were not used 
with restraint. General Howe understood that the Shrecklichkeit policy would only end up 
doing more harm than good, and in effect, when random soldiers and officers pillaged, 
plundered, raped and murdered the local populace, it only fueled the flames of 
opposition. This outrage allowed General Washington to grow a stronger, more effective 
guerrilla force and implement a guerrilla warfare-indirect approach strategy executed by 
his Continental Army, the militias and partisans. This opposite approach strategic 
interaction in the New Jersey campaign, with General Howe’s forces utilizing a direct 
approach strategy, and General Washington’s forces implementing an indirect approach 
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strategy, enabled the weaker American forces to effectively deflect their stronger 
adversaries’ advantages, and consequently, win the battle for New Jersey.   
The Hudson Valley campaign, between General Burgoyne’s forces against 
General Horatio Gates’ Northern Army from June until October of 1777, was a 
microcosm of the strategic interaction between the British and American forces 
throughout the American Revolution. Initially Burgoyne’s army and resources greatly 
outnumbered and overpowered Gate’s amateur forces. When Burgoyne began his 
campaign in Canada he had over 8,300 soldiers. Due to his extensive and burdensome 
supply trains and the atrocities his men committed against the local populace, the further 
Burgoyne moved away from his lines of communication pursuing his American 
adversaries, the more his men and supplies were attrited by the irregular warfare tactics 
of Gate’s army, militia, and partisans. By the time Burgoyne’s army engaged in a force 
on force battle at Bemis Heights his forces numbered only 3,500 men while Gate’s soared 
to over 11,000. What began as a direct approach strategy by the British in the form of a 
direct attack against an indirect approach guerrilla warfare strategy by Gate’s vastly 
outnumbered forces, culminated in a same approach engagement three months later at 
Bemis Heights.  Gates and his continental soldiers, now the stronger actor, were able to 
defeat his weaker adversary in a force on force battle. Gates, initially the weaker actor, 
effectively conducted a campaign of detachment as T. E. Lawrence explained, seeking 
the enemy’s weakest link and bearing down on it until its defeat makes the mass of the 
enemy’s forces fall. In the end, Gate’s indirect approach strategy via guerrilla warfare 
against Burgoyne’s stronger military forces implementing a direct attack, gave way to a 
same approach strategy at Bemis Heights, resulting in the more powerful army winning. 
Initially however, it was an opposite-approach, strategic interaction, the stronger actor’s 
direct attack, versus the weaker actor’s indirect approach-guerrilla warfare strategy, 
which resulted in General Gates deflecting his stronger adversary’s supposed enormous 
advantages, which ultimately resulted in the weaker actor winning.  
Unlike the Hudson Valley Campaign, the Southern Campaign did not have a 
culminating-decisive force on force battle. Instead, Nathanael Greene predominantly 
implemented a guerrilla warfare counter-strategy against his stronger adversary’s direct 
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attack strategy. Greene and his partisan forces attempted to avoid direct force on force 
engagements due to the overwhelming imbalance of power the British possessed. The 
few times Greene engaged in large-scale battle against the stronger British forces, at 
Guilford Courthouse, Post Ninety-Six, and Eutaw Springs, he suffered tactical defeats.203 
It was Greene’s proclivity to divide his forces, violating the principle of concentration 
that was unheard of at the time,204 and his ability to compliment the unorthodox tactics of 
Southern partisan leaders, such as Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion, the “Swamp 
Fox,” that led to his success. Greene’s strategy personified the future maxim of guerrilla 
leader Mao Zedong by advancing when the enemy retreated, harassing the enemy while 
he camped, attacking the enemy when he tired, and pursuing the enemy when retreated. 
Ultimately this opposite approach strategic interaction, Greene’s indirect approach 
against Cornwallis’ direct approach, resulted in the weaker actor being able to deflect the 
stronger actor’s overwhelming advantages until he capitulated, with Cornwallis finally 
retreating to Wilmington and abandoning the campaign for the Southern Colonies.  
The strategy, counter-strategy interactions in New York, New Jersey, the Hudson 
Valley, and the Southern Colonies eventually led to a direct force on force engagement at 
Yorktown on September 28, 1781, the culminating battle of the Revolutionary War. After 
six years of avoiding decisive battles with his stronger adversary, General Washington, 
with an army of over 18,000 men and naval superiority in the Chesapeake Bay under 
French Admiral DeGrasse,205 finally outnumbered and overwhelmed a besieged British 
army of only 9,000 soldiers.206 The weaker actor’s strategy of avoiding direct 
engagements in order to keep his army and the cause alive was now the stronger actor. 
Washington, in Mao Zedong’s terms, had successfully upheld the strategy of a protracted 
war and campaigns of quick decisions and opposed protracted campaigns and a strategy 
of quick decisions, until everything aligned in his favor. The Battle of Yorktown thus 
became a same approach strategic interaction; Washington’s direct attack strategy against 
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Cornwallis’ direct defense strategy, with the stronger actor, General Washington and his 
combined force of American, French, and militia soldiers winning outright. 
Finally, it is important to consider why Washington was so focused on direct 
engagements and longed for a force-on-force confrontation with the British, especially 
when the indirect approach was successful.  
E. WHY TRADITIONAL LARGE-SCALE WARFARE? 
If Washington’s war of detachment, or indirect-guerrilla warfare strategy, was so 
effective throughout the American Revolution, why did he continually strive to develop a 
professional army and employ it utilizing a direct attack, force on force, strategy? Did he 
simply resort to the eighteenth century European way of war? There is evidence to 
suggest that Washington’s code of honor and aristocratic upbringing compelled him to 
want to fight war through the established norms of direct confrontation. However, 
Washington at his core was a pragmatist. He fought the type of war with the resources he 
had available in order to win. In doing so he fought indirectly when he realized his army 
was not capable of applying force, and applied overwhelming force when his army had 
the capability to do so.   
Perhaps most importantly, however, his desire to fight a “traditional” form of war 
using overwhelming force was based upon his passion to end the war quickly. Both the 
American and the English leadership at the beginning of the war hoped for a quick end to 
the conflict. They saw the use of overwhelming force as the best way to accomplish this.  
Both adversaries initially believed overwhelming force, the British via a direct 
attack, and the Americans by fighting a direct defense, would achieve a quick, decisive 
victory and therefore be able to impose their will on the opposing government. After the 
Battle of New York, however, when both sides failed to accomplish their objective of 
destroying or capturing the enemy’s military, both commanding generals adjusted their 
strategies accordingly. General Howe employed a cautious and methodical pursuit of the 
Continental Army across New Jersey in order to promote an air of invincibility and 
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destroy the Americans’ faith in their Continental Army.207 Washington, on the other 
hand, lacked the resources, the manpower, and the training to wage a traditional war. He 
resorted to an indirect strategy of attrition, what today would be called guerrilla warfare, 
to weaken his enemy over time and force England to eventually withdraw its support for 
the war. The conflict became a war of finesse versus a war of force.   
Washington’s undisciplined, ill-equipped, and outnumbered army led him to a 
finesse approach, but he was not completely opposed to it. His frustration with his 
undisciplined force was not the result of unruly subordinates. In eighteenth century 
warfare, well-trained disciplined soldiers were paramount on the battlefield in order to 
effectively maneuver and bring the ultimate amount force at a specific place and time to 
overpower the adversary’s weak points.208 Washington’s army did not have the training 
to perform these disciplined maneuvers, nor did he have the manpower. 
Washington continually struggled to maintain a sufficient number of personnel to 
adequately sustain a standing army.209  On New Year’s Day in 1776, for example, the 
remainder of Washington’s recruits from New England, who had not done so already, left 
the Army when their enlistment ended. Washington struggled with retention of citizen-
soldiers throughout the war and feared it would lead “the Country to desolation, and the 
Cause perhaps to irretrievable Ruin.”210  To compensate for his manpower deficiencies, 
Washington repeatedly instructed his soldiers to partner with the local partisan and militia 
forces. He complained about their lack of discipline but realized their value,211 directing 
his subordinates to work with the militia and partisans to annoy and harass the enemy but 
avoid a general engagement.212 He did not confine himself to a code of honor fighting a 
“gentlemen’s way of war” either. 
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Washington employed irregular tactics that some would call acts of terrorism, and 
they definitely qualified as acts of sabotage. To compensate for America’s woeful naval 
disadvantage against the British Royal navy, Washington personally planned 
unconventional means to destroy enemy vessels. He encouraged one French officer in the 
winter of 1778–1779 to “creep upon the ice,” and “set on fire one or two of the enemy’s’ 
ships, by means of sulphured shirts.”213 He even developed and carried out a plan to 
destroy British ships by employing explosive laden barrels, but the plan ended in disaster 
when a loose barrel floated away and exploded prematurely killing two boys who 
attempted to retrieve it.214  
When Washington had the better resources and capabilities, however, he used 
them. When Congress ordered Washington to defeat the significantly weaker Mohawk 
Indians in the spring of 1779, he employed overwhelming force to affect “the total 
destruction and devastation of their [the Indians] settlements and the capture of as many 
prisoners of every age and sex as possible,” emphasizing that the Indian lands must, “not 
be merely overrun, but destroyed…You will not by any means listen to any overture of 
peace before the total ruin of their settlements is affected.” 215  Washington used force to 
win quickly when he had the capability to do so.  
Washington’s use of overwhelming force against the Mohawk Indians, his 
decision to partner with the local militia and partisans to wage an indirect war, and his 
acts of sabotage against the British Royal Navy, all demonstrate his ability to use 
whatever means were at his disposal to defeat his enemy, not eschewing one form of 
warfare or the other. His concern with a war of attrition was the fact it would take time, 
which was something that he believed he could not afford.  Washington yearned for a 
powerful, professionally trained army that could defeat the British in a decisive battle in 
order to bring a quick end to the war and not unduly test the resolve of the American 
populace.  The entrance of French military, and the professional training conducted by 
Baron Von Steuben provided Washington with both, finally resulting in a decisive 
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victory that compelled the British populace to realize the cost of the war was more than 
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IV. THE VIETNAM WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Almost 200 years after the powerful British Royal Navy sailed into New York 
harbor in 1775 fully expecting the weaker Continental Army to surrender at the mere site 
of the awesome array of British power, U.S. Marines waded ashore at Da Nang in South 
Vietnam on March 8, 1965, fully expecting that the most powerful and affluent nation in 
the world would quickly defeat the weaker Vietcong insurgents. Phil Caputo, a Marine 
lieutenant at the time, remarked “When we marched into the rice paddies on that damp 
March afternoon, we carried, along with our packs and rifles, the implicit convictions that 
the Vietcong would be quickly beaten.”216 Similarly a journalist visiting the U.S. aircraft 
carrier Ranger off the coast of Vietnam in 1965 remarked, “They just ought to show this 
ship to the Vietcong; that would make them give up.”217 The United States’ leadership 
and populace believed the war would be over quickly. Whatever “first” is used to mark 
the United States’ entry into the Vietnam conflict—the first U.S. military advisors in 
1950 during the French-Indochina war,218 the first rounds fired at North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 02, 1964, or the first combat troops 
deployed to Da Nang in March of 1965—over three million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines would deploy to Vietnam over the course of five U.S. presidents, from 
Eisenhower to Ford, only to see the main objective of each of those presidents, ensuring 
the South Vietnam “domino” did not fall to communism, ultimately fail.  
Both the United States and the North Vietnamese sought to break the will of their 
adversary via a war of attrition. The way each side implemented their strategy, however, 
could not have been more different. The United States sought to use its advanced 
technology, powerful military, and rich economy to destroy North Vietnam’s military 
capabilities, pummeling its weaker adversary into submission. As General William 
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Depuy explained at the time, “[t]he solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, 
more napalm…till the other side cracks and gives up.”219 At the same time, Ho Chi Minh 
explained to a French visitor prior to the French-Indochina war, “[y]ou can kill ten of my 
men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and I will win,”220 
Thus, the North Vietnamese sought a different kind of attrition strategy. They were fully 
aware they could not compete with the United States’ superior technology and firepower, 
so instead of pounding their enemy into submission, the North Vietnamese took a 
finessed approach and whittled the American goliath away, wreaking havoc on U.S. 
public support for the war, which ultimately resulted in the United States’ complete 
withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973. Two years later, in the absence of U.S. support, 
the North Vietnamese Army toppled the South Vietnamese Government.  
Although the United States and North Vietnam attempted to wage a war of 
attrition according to their own strengths, each side implemented both direct and indirect 
strategies at various times throughout the conflict. General Giap, commander of the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA), emphasized an indirect guerrilla warfare strategy when he felt 
he could not directly confront U.S. military power. However, on several occasions he 
executed a traditional large-scale warfare strategy attempting to hasten victory. Likewise, 
the United States implemented both direct and indirect strategies concurrently from the 
start of the war until the very end with differing degrees of emphasis placed on each 
strategy depending on U.S. leadership. Ultimately, it was the ability of the North 
Vietnamese to wage a protracted war against the strongest military power in the world 
that led to victory. Waning U.S. public support for the war led to the complete 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces and funding, enabling the North Vietnamese Army to 
defeat South Vietnam in a traditional force on force decisive battle, 10 years after the first 
U.S. combat troops waded ashore at Da Nang.  
This chapter offers an overview of the war and highlights three key phases: 
President Kennedy’s flexible response strategy via military advisors from 1961 through 
1963; Lyndon B. Johnson’s gradual escalation and Americanization strategies from 1964 
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through 1968; and President Nixon’s redeployment of U.S. troops via his Vietnamization 
strategy from 1969 until the war’s end in 1975. Within these key phases, this chapter will 
attempt to determine why key U.S. civilian and military leaders chose to escalate the war 
and wage a traditional large-scale warfare strategy despite advice from several senior 
government officials for an alternative approach. As Lyndon B. Johnson despairingly 
exclaimed to his Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1967, “[b]omb, bomb, bomb, that’s all you 
know…When we add divisions, can’t the enemy add divisions? If so where does it all 
end?”221  
B. BACKGROUND TO THE WAR 
On September 2, 1945 after allied forces defeated Japan in World War II and gave 
up its occupation of Vietnam, Vietnamese people of all ages, beliefs, and sects gathered 
in Hanoi to listen to Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, (the 
Vietnam Independence League, also known as the Vietminh), declare Vietnam’s 
independence, using words from the United States Declaration of Independence, “[w]e 
hold the truth that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights, among them like, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”222  
France, however, had other plans. It did not want to give up its wealthy colonial 
possessions in Indochina. This presented the United States with an interesting problem: 
back a nation seeking independence, or support an ally who played an integral role in the 
power structure opposing the spread of communism in Europe but also wanted to 
perpetuate colonialism. Advisors to President Truman believed Vietnam would become a 
communist country if it won its independence from France, specifically because of Ho 
Chi Minh’s ties to Moscow,223 despite the fact that Ho Chi Minh appealed to the United 
States for support on numerous occasions throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century.224 In 1946, President Truman chose to support its European ally. The French 
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Indochina war ensued, lasting almost 10 years, and ensnaring the United States into 
providing the French with military equipment, funding, and advisors totaling over $2.6 
billion in military aid,225 and creating a Military Advisory and Assistance Group 
(MAAG) in Saigon that helped train the Vietnamese Army.226 
Inevitably, as then Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy exclaimed, no amount 
of military support could defeat “an enemy of the people which had the support and 
covert appeal of the people.”227 The French suffered a devastating defeat at the battle of 
Dienbienphu in April of 1954. During this battle, they implored the United States to 
provide relief to its embattled soldiers but were rebuffed due to the Eisenhower’s refusal 
to commit U.S. troops without international support for the war. With the allied 
countries’, specifically England, refusal to support colonialism, and the absence of U.S. 
military air power, the French were unable to withstand the Vietminh’s unrelenting 
artillery barrages and continuous assaults; France surrendered on May 7, 1954.   
The defeat at Dienbienphu gave rise to the Geneva Accords of 1954, which 
outlined a temporary division of Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel to permit the 
regrouping of military forces on both sides but that was not supposed to constitute a 
political or territorial boundary; scheduled elections for the summer of 1964 to reunify 
the country; withdrawal of troops from the partition zones within 300 days; prohibit of 
the introduction of new forces, equipment, or foreign military bases to prevent Vietnam 
from descending back into conflict; and neither side of the conflict was permitted to join 
a military alliance, except in the case where their security was clearly threatened.228  
With the threat of communism spreading, the Soviet’s formal recognition of the 
Vietminh in 1950, the fall of Chang Kai Shek’s Chinese government to Mao Ze Dong’s 
communist forces also in 1950, communist North Korea invading South Korea and the 
Korean war, and then France’s defeat in 1964, Eisenhower’s warning that if Indochina 
                                                 
225 Herring, America’s Longest War, 44. 
226 Herring, America’s Longest War, 23. 
227 Herring, America’s Longest War, 38. 
228 Herring, America’s Longest War, 43. 
 61 
fell the rest of Southeast Asia would “go over quickly” like a “row of dominos”229 
appeared to be more than just theory.  Unhappy with the French defeat, President 
Eisenhower’s administration believed it did, however, provide the United States with 
some advantages. The Geneva Accords gave the United States an opportunity to build a 
non-communist state in South Vietnam, and the two year delay to holding national 
elections provided a sufficient amount of time to find an alternative to the Vietminh. 
With the French’s colonial ties to Vietnam out of the way, the United States felt confident 
it could prevent communism in Northern Vietnam from spreading throughout Southeast 
Asia and the Southwest Pacific.230 After the defeat of the French, the United States took 
up the mantle of defending Laos, Cambodia, and the southern portion of Vietnam below 
the seventeenth parallel, as Eisenhower’s Secretary of State Jonathan Dulles explained, 
“to keep alive freedom.”231 
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s containment strategy 
in Southeast Asia. Recalling the appeasement of Hitler that led to the Second World War, 
Kennedy believed that the United States must prevent “the onrushing tide of Communism 
from engulfing all of Asia,” and declared Vietnam “a proving ground for democracy in 
Asia…a test of American responsibility and determination.” 232After his first summit 
with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in June, 1961, Kennedy explained, “[n]ow we 
have a problem in making our power credible, and Vietnam is the place.”233 This 
commitment to upholding democracy, preventing communism from spreading throughout 
the free world, and maintaining America’s credibility and prestige in the world would 
repeatedly be used to justify increasing the United States’ almost zealous-like 
commitment to South Vietnam over the next decade. 
In 1961, the United States began the addition of military advisors in Vietnam and 
the subsequent commitment of military equipment and combat troops that would 
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dramatically escalate over the next two presidential administrations. In an attempt to 
prevent the dominos from falling in Southeast Asia—and potentially Africa and Latin 
America—the United States would have over 550,000 troops in South Vietnam at the 
height of the war, and would drop more bombs on North Vietnam than were used by 
Allied Forces throughout all of World War II. The more the United States committed 
soldiers, equipment, and aid to South Vietnam to protect its prestige and credibility in 
defending democracy, the more its credibility and prestige became inextricably linked to 
succeeding in Vietnam.234  
The course of the war went through several different phases, unsurprisingly 
dependent upon the presidential administration in office, from President Kennedy’s 
flexible response strategy via military advisors from 1961 through 1963, Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s gradual escalation and Americanization strategies from 1964 through 1968, to 
President Nixon’s redeployment of U.S. troops via his Vietnamization strategy from 1969 
until the war’s end in 1975. It is important to look at each of these phases to determine 
which strategy and counter-strategy occurred, whether the correct strategic interaction 
was employed by the United States, and finally, whether right or wrong, why the United 
States chose a specific counter-strategy.  
C. KEY PHASES  
1. The Military Advisor Phase: 1961–1963 
When President Kennedy came to office in 1961 the threat of communism was 
not only on the rise but looked very much as if it was taking root in many parts of the 
world. Kennedy, painted as being soft on communism by his presidential opponent 
Richard Nixon, immediately faced the Bay of Pigs crisis, and the construction of the 
Berlin Wall the same year, followed by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and Nikita 
Khrushchev’s speech in 1963 declaring the Soviet Union’s support for wars of national 
liberation. Kennedy realized the threat was no longer just nuclear warfare but irregular 
warfare as well; the front against communism was no longer central Europe, but 
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Southeast Asia, and specifically South Vietnam.235 If Vietnam fell to communism, the 
theory went, so too would all of Southeast Asia, and potentially Africa and Latin 
America.236 In order to combat Khrushchev’s wars of national liberation, Kennedy 
moved away from Eisenhower’s “muscle-bound” mass retaliation strategy and developed 
what came to be known as the flexible response strategy, utilizing controlled and 
graduated responses that integrated military, political, and diplomatic power.237   
Kennedy’s initial strategy aimed at defending South Vietnam focused on 
increasing economic and military aid to Saigon in conjunction with the deployment of 
U.S. military advisors.238 Part of Kennedy’s strategy relied on counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations, which he implemented in response to General Maxwell Taylor’s support of 
the flexible response strategy to deal with “brush-fire” wars in the third world.239 In April 
1961, President Kennedy created a task force to provide effective economic, social, 
political, and military programs to South Vietnam. Kennedy approved strengthening 
South Vietnam’s army from 150,000 soldiers to 170,000, and increasing the number of 
U.S. military advisors by a hundred.240 Unfortunately, the growing insurgency in the 
South would soon make the situation so dire that Kennedy began to escalate the number 
of U.S. military advisors, aid, and equipment, in an attempt to “avoid a further 
deterioration of the situation.”241 
The insurgency in the South was a result of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh 
Diem’s brutal anti-communism policies. In an attempt to eliminate communist 
sympathizers and supporters, Diem and his regime implemented and enforced a policy of 
mass arrests and killings. Although initially effective, Diem’s heavy-handed and 
isolationist policies turned even those who were not communist against him. Many fled to 
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the countryside and joined guerrilla insurgents that would later become the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), also called the Vietcong, backed and supported by Ho Chi 
Minh’s North Vietnamese government.242  
With the insurgency increasing and massive numbers of the South Vietnamese 
populace protesting against Diem’s corrupt policies, Kennedy’s Joint Chiefs of Staff 
wanted to show North Vietnam and the insurgents that “we mean business,” 
recommending the deployment of six U.S. military divisions, 200,000 combat soldiers, to 
South Vietnam. Kennedy sought a less aggressive approach by increasing aid to Diem but 
did not commit to deploying combat troops. He would, however, gradually increase the 
number of U.S. military advisors from 700 during his first year in office to ultimately 
over 16,000 by the time of his assassination.243   
In addition to increasing U.S. military advisors and equipment to defend South 
Vietnam from communism, the United States also attempted to implement political and 
social reform. One such approach was the Strategic hamlet program implemented in 
1962. This program attempted to remove the insurgents from the populace by moving 
South Vietnamese peasants into fortified hamlets throughout the countryside.244  Diem 
previously implemented similar programs such as the agrovilles and village defense 
forces, but just as those programs had failed, so too did the strategic hamlets. Ultimately 
the program was a façade, as Andrew Krepinevich explains in his book The Army in 
Vietnam. It was “…fortified on paper only. In just under two years in Vietnam over 8,000 
strategic hamlets were “created,” yet no attention was paid to their purpose…”245 The 
strategic hamlet program succeeded only in alienating the population from the South 
Vietnamese government. 
At the same time the Strategic hamlet program was failing, the Vietcong was 
defeating efforts to train the South Vietnamese Army (the Army of the Republic of 
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Vietnam—ARVN). As Diem’s brutal anti-communist tactics increased, the North 
Vietnamese government decided to provide military advisors and equipment to the 
southern insurgents to stem Diem’s onslaught. Consequently, in 1963, Ho Chi Minh and 
General Giap opted to increase attacks against the ARVN to topple Diem’s regime before 
the United States became fully involved. The Vietcong, adopting a guerrilla warfare 
strategy, inflicted devastating losses against the ARVN by utilizing hit and run tactics, 
hiding amongst the populace, and choosing when and where to engage their better 
equipped and supported adversaries. Despite the South Vietnamese Army’s devastating 
losses, the increasing commitment of U.S. military aid and equipment to South Vietnam 
reinforced Diem’s belief that he needed to wage a traditional war against his adversaries, 
instead of instituting political and social reforms.246  
With political and domestic opposition in the South escalating and Diem’s own 
military leaders becoming more disenfranchised by his refusal to implement political and 
social reform, South Vietnamese Army officers staged a U.S. supported coup, murdering 
both Diem and his brother on November 2, 1963. The U.S. Ambassador to South 
Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, cabled Kennedy “[t]he prospects now are for a shorter 
war.”247 The political stability and effectiveness that President Kennedy deemed 
paramount for the success would never come to fruition, and his strategy to protect South 
Vietnam from communism through counterinsurgency operations, political, and social 
reform would end with his assassination, three weeks after Diem’s, on November 22, 
1963.  
Kennedy’s military advisor phase, although initially implemented as an indirect 
approach strategy, transitioned into a direct approach—traditional large-scale warfare 
strategy waged by the U.S. trained ARVN against the indirect—guerrilla warfare strategy 
of the North Vietnamese supported Vietcong. This opposite approach interaction resulted 
in delaying the expected quick-decisive win of the stronger actor, the United States. As a 
result, the United States increased the number of military advisors and equipment to 
prevent the South Vietnamese government from falling. North Vietnam, witnessing the 
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incremental escalation of U.S. military aid, infiltrated large conventional army units to 
South Vietnam, attempting to implement a traditional warfare strategy in an attempt to 
increase their prospects of winning before the U.S. became decisively engaged.248 
2. Americanization 1964–1968 
Lyndon B. Johnson, like presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower before him, initially 
opposed a large military commitment in Vietnam.  However, as the Vietcong stepped up 
their attacks in 1963, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported if 
something was not done to reverse the situation, South Vietnam would fall in three 
months, Johnson decided America had to act.249 He decided he could not let South 
Vietnam go the way of China and released National Security Council Action 
Memorandum (NSAM) 273 stating it was “the central objective of the United States” to 
assist the South Vietnamese government “to win their contest against the externally 
directed and supported communist conspiracy.”250 Johnson may not have imagined, 
however, that his senior military leadership would repeatedly ask for the approval to 
deploy more troops and bomb more targets in North Vietnam to such an extent that he 
would eventually ask if Vietnam was “worth all this effort.”251  
Roger Hilsman, President Johnson’s assistant secretary of state, initially 
recommended implementing a counterinsurgency strategy; training the South Vietnamese 
Army in guerrilla warfare, securing one village at a time, and defeating the Viet Cong at 
their own game. Johnson instead chose a more forceful approach favored by his Joint 
Chiefs of Staff who proposed “Americanizing” the war.  Johnson stated “[p]ower on the 
land, power in the air, power wherever it’s necessary. We’ve got to commit to it.”252 He 
believed North Vietnam would fold under the military and economic power of the United 
States. Johnson proceeded with a gradual escalation strategy, using enough military force 
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that would “be enough, but not too much”253 to avoid creating opposition to the war in 
the United States while at the same time being careful not to provoke the Soviet Union 
and China into entering the war. General Westmoreland, commander of Military 
Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV), sought to accomplish President Johnson’s 
“just enough” approach via a strategy of attrition by wearing away the North Vietnamese 
until they could no longer replace the devastating losses the U.S. military inflicted on 
them, which he referred to as the “crossover point.”254 This attrition strategy focused on 
defeating the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese Army, and North Vietnam’s military 
capabilities via an air war, a ground war, and “the other” war—a pacification program 
aimed at building local support for the South Vietnamese government.  
The air war escalated dramatically after two U.S. destroyers, the USS Maddox and 
Turner Joy, reported coming under attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on the night 
of August 3, 1964, what later became known as the Gulf of Tonkin incident. To force the 
North Vietnamese into surrendering, Johnson authorized a series of major air campaigns, 
Operation Flaming Dart, Rolling Thunder I, and Rolling Thunder II, beginning in August 
of 1964 and lasting until November 1968. The air campaign was supposed to last only a 
few weeks until North Vietnam agreed to discontinue supporting the communist 
insurgency in South Vietnam. However, the more munitions the United States dropped on 
North Vietnam, the more North Vietnam resolved to support the insurgency, topple the 
South Vietnamese government, and outlast the more powerful U.S. military.  
The United States’ ground war was a traditional large-scale warfare strategy that 
initially focused on a strategic defense but quickly transitioned to focusing on the 
destruction of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese military forces. Westmoreland 
doubled the number of U.S. military advisors in 1964, but as the air campaign escalated 
and U.S. airbases came under increasing attack from Vietcong guerrillas, President 
Johnson approved Westmoreland’s request to deploy combat troops to South Vietnam to 
protect the airbases. The defensive posture soon turned into offensive patrols with the 
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ARVN, which turned into unilateral U.S. search and destroy operations. U.S. combat 
troops escalated from one Marine battalion in March of 1965, to 184,000 U.S. troops by 
the end of the year, to 486,000 by the end of 1967,255 and nearly 550,000 in 1968.256  
The ground war from 1965–1968 was characterized by large scale search and 
destroy operations. Operations such as Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City 
consisted of over thousands of U.S. and ARVN troops supported by U.S. firepower 
sweeping through the South Vietnamese countryside attempting to force the enemy into 
battle.257 Civilians within President Johnson’s administration, to include Secretary of 
Defense McNamara, who was the initial architect of the gradual escalation strategy, 
began to realize destroying the North Vietnamese military capability via strategic 
bombing, and attritting the North Vietnamese Army by using search and destroy 
operations were not working.258 The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, so opposed Westmoreland’s attrition strategy he threatened to resign as a show of 
protest.259 Westmoreland’s war of attrition was unattainable due to North Vietnam’s 
resolve to reunify the country, its ability to supply 200,000 military aged males per year 
to the war in the South,260 its agrarian society that limited U.S. strategic bombing 
effectiveness, and its ability to check the military aide and equipment the South received 
from the Soviet Union and China.261  The elusive VC and NVA were able to pick and 
choose when and where they wanted to fight. One U.S. general during JUNCTION CITY  
stated “it was a sheer physical impossibility to keep the enemy from slipping away 
whenever he wished if he were in terrain with which he was familiar—generally the 
case.”262 
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A less-emphasized aspect of the United States’ Americanization strategy was the 
pacification program, also referred to as “the other war.”263 Johnson believed a key 
element in defeating the Vietcong was gaining the support of the South Vietnamese 
populace, and prodded the South Vietnamese government to implement a Revolutionary 
Development (RD) Program. The RD program consisted of 59 man teams that operated 
in hamlets, lived with the people, and tried to develop support for the government.264 The 
U.S. Marine Corps had some success with a similar approach known as Combined Action 
Platoons (CAPS). Each CAP consisted of 15 marines and 34 local Vietnamese 
paramilitary Popular Forces (PF). The CAPS focused on COIN operations, local security 
and government infrastructure.265 Another aspect of the pacification program was 
improving the capability of the Vietnamese local Regional Forces—Popular Forces 
(RF—PF units, also known as “Ruff-Puffs).266 Although each program has some success, 
the U.S. military during the Americanization phase of the war placed a low priority on 
the pacification program. As a U.S. Army general explained, “I had two rules. One is that 
you would try to get a very close meshing of pacification…and military operations. The 
other rule is the military operations would be given first priority in every case.”267 
The Vietcong and NVA launched a spectacular, but unsuccessful, surprise attack 
throughout South Vietnam on January 30, 1968. Known as the Tet Offensive, it was a 
traditional-scale offensive that consisted of over 70,000 VC and NVA soldiers attacking 
over a hundred towns and villages throughout South Vietnam, including Saigon and the 
U.S. Embassy.  Just months earlier General Westmoreland stated enemy ranks were 
thinning and the end was beginning to come into view.268 Westmoreland asked President 
Johnson for an additional 200,000 U.S. troops to capitalize on the losses the U.S. military 
inflicted on the Vietcong (over 40,000 NVA and Vietcong were killed during the Tet 
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Offensive, the majority of them Vietcong).269 Johnson realized, however, there was no 
military solution to winning the war,270 and denied Westmoreland’s request, agreeing to 
only a token number of forces. President Johnson explained he would make the 
expansion and improvement of South Vietnamese forces his top priority. He also ceased 
bombing North Vietnam above the twentieth parallel, and shocked the nation by 
declaring he would not accept his party’s nomination for another term as president.271 
The end of the Americanization strategy had begun. 
General Westmoreland’s attrition strategy and the Americanization of the war 
effectively transitioned the U.S. military from an advisory role directing the ARVN to 
wage a direct attack strategy to one that saw it taking the lead and shouldering the 
majority of the burden. Westmoreland’s attrition strategy focused primarily on a 
traditional large-scale warfare approach; relying upon overwhelming mass, maneuver, 
and firepower to destroy North Vietnam’s military forces and military capability. After 
the VC and NVA’s devastating military defeat during the Tet Offensive, General Giap 
realized his forces could not compete with the United States’ overwhelming firepower 
and reverted back to a protracted war.   
3. Vietnamization 1969–1975 
Nixon was elected on the platform of an honorable peace in Vietnam and bringing 
the U.S. soldiers home and implemented a Vietnamization strategy, focused on gradually 
transitioning the war effort back to the South Vietnamese Army. Within his first year in 
office 60,000 service members came home. At the end of 1970 U.S troop strength was 
down to 280,000, and the following year U.S. forces were decreased by an additional 
140,000.272 General Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland as the MACV 
commander and implemented a clear and hold “one war” strategy. This approach placed 
an equal emphasis on improving the South Vietnam’s army, the pacification program, 
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and military operations. Abrams explained all aspects of his strategy were “interrelated so 
that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in the others.”273 He 
focused not on the number of enemy killed but on providing security for the South 
Vietnamese populace.274 
As the United States drastically reduced forces after Nixon’s first year in office, 
the ARVN pacification program was showing signs of effectiveness. In his book 
Bombing to Win, Robert Pape explains that, despite U.S. forces leaving, the Vietcong 
controlled 23 percent of South Vietnam in 1968 but only three percent in 1972; this was a 
sign that the pacification was working.275 According to Lewis Sorley, in late 1970 “the 
fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won...the South Vietnamese countryside had been 
widely pacified, so much so that the term ‘pacification’ was no longer even used.”276 
William Colby, in charge of the pacification program under General Abrams, observed 
that by 1972 “the pacification program had essentially eliminated the guerrilla problem in 
most of the country.”277 
One part of the Accelerated Pacification Program that was particularly effective 
was the Phoenix program, in which South Vietnamese personnel trained by U.S. advisors 
penetrated the command and control structure of the Vietcong. In 1969 the program was 
said to have “neutralized” 19,534 key personnel within the Vietcong, with only 6,187 
being killed.  One Vietcong leader explained that they “never feared a division of troops, 
but a couple of guys into our ranks created tremendous difficulties for us.”278 
As U.S. force strength decreased and the pacification program received greater 
emphasis, Nixon believed he could effectively threaten the North Vietnamese with 
annihilation, forcing them to the negotiating table.279 According to John Lewis Gaddis, 
                                                 
273 Sorley, A Better War, 18. 
274 Sorley, A Better War, 22. 
275 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 196. 
276 Sorley, A Better War, 217. 
277 Sorley, A Better War, 305. 
278 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 617. 
279 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 597. 
 72 
ironically, the withdrawal of U.S. forces provided Nixon with greater flexibility.280 In the 
spring of 1970, Nixon approved U.S. ground and air operations in Cambodia, targeting 
Vietcong and NVA sanctuaries, explaining he had to show North Vietnam via force that 
the United States was still committed to the South Vietnamese government.281 Once the 
American public became aware of the U.S. operations in Cambodia, seeing it as a 
complete reversal of Nixon’s pledge to wind down the war, it inflamed the anti-war 
protests across the United States. 
North Vietnamese leadership realized time was on their side as U.S. public 
discontent to the war drastically increased. When Nixon’s National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger, proposed North Vietnam could leave its forces in the South while the 
U.S. withdrew, contrary to the “mutual” withdrawal policy U.S. leadership had always 
required for a cease fire, the North Vietnamese denied the offer, believing victory was 
within reach.282  Nixon retaliated by instituting the most intensive bombing campaigns of 
the war, Linebacker I and Linebacker II.283  Linebacker II lasted for 11 days in December 
of 1972, until the North Vietnamese agreed to return to the negotiating table and on 
January 27, 1973, a peace agreement was signed between the two countries. The United 
States agreed to withdraw its remaining troops. North Vietnam was allowed to leave its 
forces in South Vietnam but gave up its insistence that South Vietnam’s president step 
down.284  
Many attribute Nixon’s withering Linebacker II bombing campaign to be the 
proverbial straw that broke North Vietnam’s back; however, the North Vietnamese knew 
they would soon be able to achieve what they initially set out to accomplish in 1963, the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. After 10 years of deflecting U.S. 
power by implementing an irregular warfare strategy, although at times attempting to 
wage a traditional war to hasten victory, the time had come when North Vietnam could 
                                                 
280 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 299. 
281 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 622. 
282 Herring, America’s Longest War, 273. 
283 Herring, America’s Longest War, 273. 
284 Herring, America’s Longest War, 276. 
 73 
agree to a peace settlement. U.S. public support for the war, after Nixon’s invasion of 
Cambodia and world condemnation of the no holds barred Linebacker II bombing 
campaign, was at an all-time low. U.S. war costs were projected to exceed $22 billion per 
year.285 According to Stanley Karnow, in his book Vietnam—A History, the U.S. Marine 
Corps could not achieve its recruiting goals and the only combat-ready division 
defending the United States, the 82nd Airborne, was at 33 percent strength as a result of 
providing a majority of its forces to South Vietnam.286 North Vietnam had successfully 
resisted its stronger adversary’s overwhelming military capabilities long enough for the 
United States to determine that the benefits of defending South Vietnam from 
communism were simply not worth the cost. Nixon’s resignation from office meant he 
was unable to fulfill his promise to provide U.S. air support to the South Vietnamese 
Army. North Vietnam overthrew South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, by waging a 
traditional warfare strategy against South Vietnam, less than two years after the last U.S. 
troops left the country.  
D. STRATEGIC INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
The United States used military advisors to train the Vietnamese Army as early as 
1950 and placed a major emphasis on the advisor role after the French defeat in 1964; 
despite this fact, the U.S. approach did not result in an indirect approach or irregular 
warfare strategy. Only a small fraction of U.S. aid for South Vietnam went toward 
political and economic reform from 1955 through 1959; the bulk of it, 78 percent, was for 
military assistance.287 The U.S. MAAG commander during this period, LTG Williams, 
focused ARVN training on what he believed was the real threat to the South Vietnamese 
government, an invasion from North Vietnam;288 he did not believe the Vietcong was a 
threat and instead convinced President Diem to focus on increasing the strength of his 
conventional army instead of political and economic reform.289  
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John F. Kennedy adopted a COIN strategy in 1961 based on the advice of COL 
Lansdale, an experienced COIN specialist with the Office of Strategic Services during 
World War II, and the communist-led Hukbalhap Rebellion in the Philippines afterward, 
focusing more on political and administrative reforms instead of a traditional warfare 
strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Kennedy’s COIN strategy, believing 
that wars of national liberation were a distraction from the main threat from communism 
in Europe, and that COIN was simply an additional infantry task. As the Chief of Staff of 
the Army explained to President Kennedy, “any good soldier can handle guerrillas.”290 
Consequently, the U.S. military advisors under MAC-V trained and advised the ARVN to 
destroy the Vietcong and North Vietnam’s military. When indirect strategies were 
implemented, such as the strategic hamlet program or village defense forces, they did not 
effectively address gaining the support of the populace.  The strategic hamlet program 
collapsed in 1963 with a British COIN expert, Sir Robert Thompson, frustratingly 
explaining that “[n]o attention was paid to the purpose, the creation became the purpose 
itself.”291 Ultimately the indirect programs decreased support for the South Vietnamese 
government, took land away from the villagers, and focused more on security than social, 
economic, and educational reforms. 
Employing Arreguín-Toft’s criteria, the military advisor phase of the Vietnam 
War was a direct attack strategy employed by a stronger actor, the United States 
supporting the ARVN, against an indirect strategy by a weaker actor, the Vietcong and 
NVA, utilizing guerrilla warfare. The Vietcong successfully waged a war of detachment, 
using hit and run tactics, and hiding amongst and gaining the support of the populace. 
This strategy effectively deflected U.S. firepower, air mobility, and military advisory 
support to the ARVN. As a result of its frustration with the growing communist 
insurgency, the United States increased U.S. forces and combat operations in an attempt 
to achieve a quick victory by overpowering its weaker adversary.  
Once Lyndon B. Johnson took office, in November of 1963, he vowed he would 
not be the first American president to lose a war, stating the United States should stop 
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“playing cops and robbers” in Vietnam and win; he told senior military leadership he 
would give them everything they needed to succeed.292 General Westmoreland’s strategy 
of attrition aimed to “…just go on bleeding them until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that 
they have bled their country to the point of national disaster for generations”293 was 
taking a gruesome toll on the United States. Although he proclaimed the United States 
was “in it for the long haul,”294 his long-term strategy merely consisted of repeatedly 
asking for more troops and bombing more targets to achieve victory in two to three years.  
The NVA and Vietcong were able to minimize the effects of the United States’ 
superior technology and firepower by hiding amongst the populace, “clinging to the 
belts” of the Americans to minimize the use of U.S. air support, and choosing when to 
attack and when to retreat. Ninety-six percent of all ground combat in 1967 was 
company-size operations, 120 men or smaller, and 88 percent of all engagements were 
initiated by the Vietcong or NVA.295 North Vietnam was also able to sustain the 
devastating effects of the United States’ strategic bombing campaigns for a variety of 
reasons but, according to the Jason study conducted in 1966, primarily because North 
Vietnam was “an unrewarding target for air raids; the volume of supplies sent south was 
too small to be stopped by airstrikes and…the country had ample manpower to keep its 
primitive logistical network alive.”296   
The Americanization phase of the Vietnam War ended after the Tet offensive in 
the spring of 1968, when President Johnson realized a military solution to the war was an 
illusion. Using Arguine-Toft’s strategic dynamic model, North Vietnam was effectively 
able to deflect the United States’ direct attack strategy by implementing predominantly an 
indirect-guerrilla warfare counterstrategy until General Giap chose a direct attack 
strategy, the Tet Offensive in the spring of 1968, to generate a popular uprising among 
the South Vietnamese populace. This primarily opposite approach strategic interaction 
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prevented a quick victory expected by the stronger actor, the United States. After the Tet 
Offensive only 40 percent of the U.S. populace approved of President Johnson’s handling 
of the war.297 Frustration and disapproval of what was now a protracted war created a 
situation of political vulnerability for the Johnson administration, highlighted by his 
decision not to seek his party’s nomination for reelection. The United States sought to 
seek an alternative approach to winning the war in Vietnam, electing Richard Nixon on a 
“peace with honor” platform. Nixon would focus on withdrawing U.S. forces and relying 
on the South Vietnamese to fight the war. 
Ten-thousand U.S. service members lost their lives in South Vietnam in 1969, 
Nixon’s first year in office.298 He knew he needed a new strategy to “achieve peace with 
honor.” Nixon’s strategy consisted of several components: 1) Vietnamization, which 
focused on the withdrawal of U.S. forces while putting the onus on the ARVN to fight the 
war299;300 2) the invasion and bombing of Cambodia and Laos to destroy NVA 
sanctuaries and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN); the command and 
control center for North Vietnam’s military operations in South Vietnam;301 3) strategic 
bombing of military targets in North Vietnam; 4) a renewed emphasis on the pacification 
program; and 5) the Phoenix program.  
By 1972 the war was primarily a South Vietnamese effort. Only 6,000 of the 
70,000 Americans that remained in South Vietnam were combat troops.302  The U.S. 
stepped up its efforts to make the ARVN a formidable fighting force capable of standing 
up to the Vietcong and NVA in the prospects of the inevitable withdrawal of the U.S. 
military, increasing the ARVN to over one million soldiers, and outfitting it with newest 
military weapons and equipment. South Vietnam also placed a renewed emphasis on its 
pacification program, dedicating 500,000 NVA soldiers specifically to securing villages 
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throughout the countryside and implementing land, economic, and political reforms.303  
When the ARVN attacked North Vietnamese forces seeking refuge in Laos in February 
of 1971, without the help of U.S. ground forces they suffered a devastation defeat, 
incurring over 50 percent causalities.304 The same scenario replayed itself when the NVA 
attacked throughout South Vietnam in the spring of 1972, known as the Easter Offensive. 
If it were not for U.S. air support, the NVA and Vietcong may have toppled the South 
Vietnamese government.305  
Although General Abrams’ Accelerated Pacification program was proving 
successful, congress voted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, redeploy all U.S. 
forces from South Vietnam, and discontinue funding for military support. Coupled with  
public opinion cresting against the war, Kissinger felt he had to proceed with North 
Vietnam’s proposal for a cease fire in exchange for the complete withdrawal of U.S. 
forces and the release of U.S. Prisoners Of War. Kissinger knew it meant the end for the 
South Vietnamese government but justified his decision by stating, “What do you want us 
to do, stay there forever?” 306  
Consequently, the North Vietnamese were able to effectively wage a protracted 
war that deflected the United States’ military might by implementing an indirect, 
guerrilla warfare strategy, and denying the stronger adversary a quick victory. The United 
States implemented an indirect strategy during the Vietnamization phase of the war by 
attempting to bomb the North Vietnamese into submission, emphasizing the pacification 
program, and by decimating the Vietcong’s key leadership via the Phoenix Program. This 
same approach strategic interaction, according to Arreguín-Toft, should have resulted in 
the stronger actor winning. By this time, however, the growing discontent for the war 
among the American public and political leaders forced the United States to capitulate. 
As a Vietnam colonel explained after the war when U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers’ 
                                                 
303 Herring, America’s Longest War, 254. 
304 Herring, America’s Longest War, 266. 
305 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 658. 
306 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 663. 
 78 
(an anti-COIN advocate) boasted that the NVA and Vietcong never defeated the U.S. 
military on the battlefield, “[t]hat may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”307  
E. WHY TRADITIONAL LARGE-SCALE WARFARE? 
United States senior military leadership, and a majority of civilian officials, 
believed that overwhelming force, whether through the use of massive air bombardments 
or large conventional army search and destroy missions, would eventually force North 
Vietnam to surrender. However, most came to the realization that the gradual escalation 
policy and overwhelming force could not achieve victory. Both Secretaries of Defense 
during the war, Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford, came into office believing the 
sheer weight of the U.S. military could overpower the Vietcong and NVA. Both would 
leave office trying to convince their presidents that overwhelming force was not a 
feasible solution.  
Archives documenting the Vietnam War are replete with instances referring to the 
United States’ decision to commit forces, whether limited initially under Kennedy, or en 
mass under Johnson, to protect its prestige and credibility in the world. President 
Kennedy commented “[w]e cannot and will not accept any visible humiliation over 
Laos,”308 when the Southeast Asian country appeared to be falling to communism, and 
applied the same philosophy to Vietnam. Kennedy’s vice president, Lyndon Johnson, 
reiterated this emphasis on perception when he said if the United States was to “throw in 
the towel…and pull our defenses back…[W]e would say to the world…that we don’t live 
up to our treaties and don’t stand by our friends.”309 Consequently, protecting the United 
States’ credibility and prestige, defending its “keystone in the archway of freedom” 
moniker, became a U.S. national security interest unto itself. As Under-Secretary of 
Defense John McNaughton wrote in 1966 “[a]t each point, to avoid the damage to our 
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effectiveness of defaulting on our commitment, we have upped the ante. We have not 
defaulted, and the ante (and commitment) is now very high.”310  
Although Kennedy was cautious of the potential slippery slope of committing 
U.S. military advisors to South Vietnam, Stanley Karnow writes, at the same time the 
policy emanating from the White House resolved to stop communism from spreading, 
“so that he could not backtrack without jeopardizing the American’s government’s 
prestige—and in time that consideration would become the main motive for the U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam.”311 This is similar to Gaddis’ observation in which he details the 
United States’ careening commitment of forces in Vietnam “…that having committed 
itself to maintaining the existing distribution of power in the world, the United States 
could not allow challenges to that distribution even to appear to succeed against its will, 
because perceptions of power could be as important as the real thing.”312 
This commitment to protect America’s prestige and credibility resulted in the 
need to demonstrate force, whether via an initial commitment of military advisors by 
Kennedy’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who explained that a small number of 
troops would act as an advance party if more were needed,313 or by President’s Nixon 
invasion and bombing of Cambodia almost 10 years later. Nixon summarized, “[i]f, when 
the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts 
like a pitiful helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free 
nations and free institutions throughout the world.”314  
The use of overwhelming force was not necessarily about its effectiveness, but 
rather the conviction and commitment the use of force portrayed. Walt Rostow tried to 
convince President Johnson in early 1965 to deploy U.S. troops and air power 
immediately to South Vietnam by explaining that China and North Vietnam “…will not 
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actually accept a setback until they are sure that we mean it,” they had to “…confront an 
LBJ who had made up his mind.”315 
The United States used overwhelming force to demonstrate commitment because 
it simply had the abundance of resources to do so. Russell Weigley argues “[a]t the 
beginning, when American military resources were slight, America made a promising 
beginning in the nurture of strategists of attrition; but the wealth of the country and its 
adoption of unlimited aims in war cut that development short, until the strategy of 
annihilation became characteristically the American way in war.”316 The “wealth of the 
country” that Weigley refers to provided ample military force for the United States to 
wage a traditional warfare strategy in Vietnam. From the onset of his presidency, 
Kennedy explained “in terms of total military strength, the United States would not trade 
places with any nation on earth,”317 while Johnson stated, “[w]e are the richest nation in 
the history of the world…We can afford to spend whatever is needed to keep this country 
safe and to keep our freedom secure. And we shall do just that.”318  
The resources America brought to bear on North Vietnam were an immense array 
of instruments of power. In a dialogue almost 30 years after the war in which senior U.S. 
officials and military leaders met with their Vietnam counterparts to determine lessons 
learned in Vietnam War, retired U.S. Army General Dale Vesser was asked by a senior 
Vietnamese official how he would have responded if he was on the receiving end of the 
massive bombing campaigns and had hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers in his 
country. General Vesser responded:  
I suggest that you may not have understood the dire consequences of 
making those attacks [in South Vietnam]. They entailed reactions on our 
part that made use of the forces and means that were available to the 
United States in carrying the fight to North Vietnam. And as you learned, 
these forces included bombers.319  
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As General Vesser contends, the U.S. responded with overwhelming force 
because, put simply, it had the resources to do so. Robert Komer, a member of Johnson’s 
National Security Council, concluded, “[f]ew of our programs—civil or military—are 
very efficient, but we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass,”320 Even 
when the use of force was inefficient the United States continued using it because it had 
disposable resources, believing that eventually the enemy’s resolve or military 
capabilities, whichever came first, would diminish long before the United States’ 
abundance of resources did.  
Although senior U.S. military officers and their civilian leaders stated publicly 
that the United States was dedicated to committing whatever amount of resources, men, 
and materiel were required to win the war regardless of how long it took, they believed 
they would win the war quickly. Robert McNamara, President Kennedy’s Defense 
Secretary, and other senior officials envisioned U.S. military advisors withdrawing from 
South Vietnam in 1964, only two years after they were initially deployed.  In 1965, 
General Westmoreland’s original three-phased strategy optimistically depicted U.S. 
troops reversing the ARVN losses by the end of the year, then mounting major offensive 
operations to destroy enemy forces by the summer of 1966, and, if the enemy still 
persisted, an additional 12 to 18 months would be required to achieve victory.321  After 
that timeline expired, Westmoreland asked Johnson for 565,000 U.S. forces in South 
Vietnam in 1967 to win the war in three more years. After the Tet Offensive in 1968, 
when there were already 550,000 U.S. forces in South Vietnam, Westmoreland asked 
Johnson for an additional 206,000 troops, so he could shorten the war.322 The United 
States believed simply increasing forces and bombing campaigns would hasten victory; 
their long-term commitment seemed to have come only in two-to-three year installments.   
If power and force implies victory, the United States had every reason to believe 
it would win quickly. Karnow writes that American officials looked at the war as a 
business plan, the larger the investment of men, equipment, and money, the greater the 
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results.323  What could not be measured was the will of the North Vietnamese to endure 
the United States military and economic power. Henry Kissinger explained in 1969, after 
five years of an escalating air campaign against North Vietnam, “I can’t believe that a 
fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point.”324 General DePuy, 
the same general that said more bombs and napalm were the solution to winning the war, 
stated, “I guess my biggest surprise, and this was a surprise in which I have lots of 
company, was that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong would continue the war 
despite the punishment they were taking.”325 A senior Vietnamese official explained to 
McNamara 30 years after the war that the United States failed to look at the war from the 
Vietnamese perspective of a nation that suffered and fought for their independence for 
4,000 years. They wanted peace as much as the United States wanted peace, “but not 
peace at any price.”326 
Perhaps U.S. leadership never gave up believing that the war could be won by 
U.S. military power. At the conference between U.S. and Vietnamese counterparts, 
McNamara himself asked why, after losing approximately one million Vietnamese lives 
every year from 1965 through 1968 as the North Vietnamese figures stated, did they not 
negotiate for peace?  A senior Vietnamese official responded,  
We understand better now that the U.S. still understands very little about 
Vietnam. Even now—in this conference—the U.S. understands very little 
about Vietnam…Never before did the people of Vietnam, from top to 
bottom, unite as they did during the years that the U.S. was bombing 
us…if at that time we had begun negotiations with the U.S., we would 
have had to explain to the people why we could negotiate with the U.S., to 
meet with the U.S., and host the U.S., while bombs fell on us…it must be 
said that at those moments, when the bombs were falling, there was 
complete unity between the leaders and the people. There could be no 
negotiations under the pressure of the bombing.327 
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U.S. leadership grossly underestimated the will of North Vietnam to endure U.S 
power. As the North Vietnam’s resolve hardened, the United States’ initial response was 
more soldiers and more bombs. As Westmoreland’s two-to-three year strategy, predicated 
upon force, became more elusive, public support for the war waned, and the United 
States’ credibility and resources slowly began to dissipate. U.S. leadership realized it had 
to find a strategy to “end the war in a manner that gave some meaning to the sacrifices 
that had been made.”328 President Johnson told the United States years earlier, on July 
28, 1965, as he was beginning to commit U.S. troops that, “[w]e cannot be defeated by 
force or arms. We will stand in Vietnam.”329 He was absolutely correct. It was not by 
force of arms that the United States was defeated, but rather, by an indirect, protracted 
war that lost the support of the public at home, the votes of Congress, and the ability to 
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This thesis has attempted to determine why, throughout America’s history, 
irregular warfare has routinely been sidelined despite the United States’ continued 
experiences with counterinsurgencies and unconventional warfare, and why irregular 
warfare has routinely been looked upon as a lesser form of war, relegated to the history 
books only to reemerge time and time again as a necessary form of warfare. Only when 
this reoccurring trend is understood can an honest debate about the utility of a traditional 
warfare versus irregular warfare proceed, and answer Clausewitz’s most important 
question, what type of war is one about to engage in and, consequently, what type of 
warfare strategy should be employed.  
This thesis, therefore, asked the seemingly simple question, why is the U.S. 
military and U.S. security mindset traditional large-scale warfare focused, even when the 
majority of threats we have faced, and undoubtedly will continue to face, are irregular?  
To answer this question, this thesis drew on Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory, 
which argues that same approach interactions (a direct strategy versus direct strategy, or 
an indirect strategy versus an indirect strategy) favor strong actors while opposite 
approach interactions (a direct strategy versus an indirect strategy, or an indirect strategy 
versus a direct strategy) favor weak actors. The strategic interaction theory was used to 
determine which strategies were employed by the United States and its adversaries, and 
consequently whether or not the United States employed the correct strategy-
counterstrategy interaction.  
This thesis also proposed the following hypotheses to better understand the 
reasons why the United States has favored traditional war throughout its history, even 
when circumstances suggested an indirect approach. First, the development and strength 
of the Unites States’ military industrial complex inhibits an irregular warfare approach to 
our nation’s military and security mindset by perpetuating and sustaining traditional 
warfare force structure and materiel via political interests, economic impact, and 
commercial lobbying of politicians. Second, geopolitical posturing by nation-states 
seeking legitimacy and prestige on the international stage ensures a traditional warfare 
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mindset and security posture. Essentially a “might is right” appearance dominates 
international geopolitics and the universally understood display of power-force 
projection. Third, the organizational construct ingrained over time that focuses on a 
hierarchical authoritative command structure striving to maximize command and control 
efficiencies hinder irregular warfare concepts that espouse decentralized operations.  
Finally, the American Revolutionary War and the Vietnam War were analyzed to 
determine which form of warfare was predominantly employed, why it was chosen, and 
whether or not it was the correct strategy-counter strategy interaction.   
A. FINDINGS 
1.  Strategic Interaction Theory: Direct Versus Indirect 
Arreguín-Toft argues that actors who are able to predict their adversary’s strategy 
could dramatically improve their chances of victory by implementing the correct 
counterstrategy.330  Same approach strategic interactions favor strong actors because 
weaker actors are unable to deflect the overwhelming power imbalance. Opposite 
approach interactions, on the other hand, favor weak actors because they are able to 
deflect or dodge strong actors’ power advantages. With time, the stronger actor 
capitulates because the war has exceeded its projected costs, either politically, 
economically, or both.  
While Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory is useful in explaining the 
importance of how a weak actor’s ability to deflect a strong actor’s superior capabilities 
can win asymmetric conflicts, his analysis of a strong actor’s barbarism strategy 
misrepresents the focus of indirect strategies. Arreguín-Toft’s two ideal attack strategies 
for a strong actor, the direct attack and barbarism, focus on utilizing force to defeat the 
adversary’s military, destroy the enemy’s military capability, or attack noncombatants to 
break the enemy’s will. He argues that a strong actor’s indirect-barbarism strategy 
intentionally targets non-combatants to force the enemy to give-up, either by breaking its 
will or denying access to the population (i.e., targeting civilian populations via strategic 
bombing campaigns or isolating populations using concentration camps). Even in a COIN 
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campaign Arreguín-Toft explains a strong actor “attempts to deter would-be insurgents 
through, for instance, a policy of reprisals against noncombatants.”331 Consequently, 
although Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory demonstrates that power does not 
automatically imply victory, each of his strategic interaction strategies, even his indirect 
approaches, rely upon the application of military power.  
The use of force against non-combatants may be practiced by a stronger actor as 
an indirect strategy; however, these actions do not conform to theories and doctrine of 
irregular warfare, which is working with the local populace to gain their support and 
approval of the government.  The strategic interaction theory would more accurately 
describe indirect and direct strategies if Arreguín-Toft included barbarism, the use of 
force against a society, as a direct attack strategy and included irregular warfare as a 
strong actor’s indirect strategy.  Direct approach strategies therefore rely upon the use of 
force to achieve a quick victory; while indirect strategies utilize a war of detachment to 
wear-down the enemy’s will or negate its support. This re-categorization would likely 
still produce the same strategic interaction outcomes but more accurately represent 
indirect and direct strategies and tactics, which is critical in applying the strategic 
interaction analysis to future wars.  
As was demonstrated in the Vietnam conflict, and even in the American 
Revolution, warfare rarely divides into either indirect and direct strategies. Commanders 
fluctuate between various strategies during various stages. George Washington and 
General Giap both waged a “bipolar strategy” moving from a war of maneuver, avoiding 
the enemy’s forces, to a war of battle, attacking the enemy. Both men alternated between 
traditional large-scale warfare and irregular warfare approaches throughout their wars. 
Likewise, both leaders implemented direct and indirect strategies at the same time. 
Finally, throughout the Vietnam War, each U.S. commander and president implemented 
multiple strategies simultaneously. This approach was perhaps best demonstrated by 
General Abrams, fighting a one war strategy that focused on both an indirect approach, 
via his accelerated pacification program, and a direct approach that focused on bombing 
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campaigns to interdict enemy troops and material in Laos and Cambodia, as well as small 
and large unit ground operations. Thus, although game theory elegantly depicts strategic 
interaction, assigning an ideal direct or indirect strategy to each actor, it cannot accurately 
capture the complexities and variables of war.  
Lastly, Arreguín-Toft also explains that the guerrilla warfare and direct attack 
strategies are results of patterns of socialization, with the direct attack emanating from the 
West’s blitzkrieg strategy after WWII and the indirect guerrilla warfare approach from 
the East’s Mao Ze Dong’s strategy to wage a protracted war against a technological 
superior foe.332 These patterns of socialization, he suggests, mean that actors are not 
entirely free to choose their own strategy because militaries’ forces, equipment, and 
training are not fungible.  Secondly, actors prioritize threats; therefore, actors develop 
forces, equipment, training, and doctrine dependent upon the most likely threat.333  
However, George Washington’s use of an indirect guerrilla warfare strategy to 
negate the superior British power advantage, and General Giap’s attempts to fight a 
traditional warfare strategy in 1963, in 1968 during the Tet Offensive, and the Easter 
Offensive in 1972, demonstrate that indirect or direct strategies are not restricted or 
unique to specific societies. In 1981, Vietnam’s Prime Minister expressed his frustration 
with Mao Zedong’s support for a protracted war against the United States when he 
lamented, “[Mao Zedong] was always ready to fight to the last Vietnamese.”334 
2. Hypotheses 
a. Hypothesis 1: The Military Industrial Complex   
Although President Eisenhower’s famous farewell address in 1961 
warned, “[i]n the council of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial 
complex,”335 research does not support the presence of the military industrialized 
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complex driving the United States’ traditional warfare security mindset. George 
Washington did not have the military industrial complex behind him when he 
continuously strove for a decisive force on force battle against the stronger British 
military. Nor did he have the military industrial complex urging him to wage a traditional 
warfare strategy against the Mohawk Indians in 1779, he simply had more power 
compared to the Mohawks.  Likewise, General Giap did not have an industrial complex 
urging him to fight a decisive battle against the French at the Red River Valley in 1951 in 
which he suffered disastrously,336 or in 1963 when he attempted a traditional warfare 
strategy against the ARVN to achieve a quick victory before the United States became 
decisively engaged in the war, or again in 1972 during the Easter Offensive. The 
traditional warfare strategy, attempting to use overwhelming force concentrated at a 
precise place and time, was implemented in an attempt of the United States to hasten 
victory.   
During the Vietnam War, U.S. presidents were concerned about not using 
enough force and appearing soft on communism, as President Kennedy confided to his 
assistant, Mike O’Donnell, he was going to pull all of the troops out of Vietnam once he 
was reelected in 1963, even if he meant he was going to be labeled a “commie” 
sympathizer.337 However, they also refrained, at times, from using overwhelming force, 
concerned they would incense public anger, just as President Johnson told his joint chiefs 
of staff to wait until after he was reelected in 1964 to escalate the war.338 Consequently, 
the military industrial complex did not dictate or coerce policy, but provided a formidable 
array of options for U.S. leadership to accomplish its goals. In other words, the military 
industrial complex simply provided the means in which the United States’ leaders, both 
military and civilian, believed they could achieve victory in the shortest amount of time.   
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b. Hypothesis 2: “Might is Right” 
A preponderance of evidence, unsurprisingly, supports the notion that 
ingrained into our human psyche, as Arreguín-Toft writes, “the root principle of 
international relations theory has been that power implies victory...”339 An overwhelming 
projection of force, assumed to deter potential aggressors and destroy engaged enemies 
drives the United States’ traditional warfare security mindset. It compelled the British to 
expect the Continental Army would capitulate at the mere sight of the powerful British 
Royal Navy sailing into the New York Harbor in 1775, and the expectation that the North 
Vietnamese would cease support of the insurgency in South Vietnam once they realized 
the full weight of the United States was preparing to bear down on them.  
In 1965 Bernard Fall wrote “…everybody likes to fight the war that he 
knows best,”340 cautioning the United States about waging the wrong type of war against 
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. However, the United States had experienced success 
with an indirect-irregular warfare approach dating back to the French and Indian War, the 
American Revolution, up through World War II. But the use of force is implemented as 
much for the effects as it is for the perceived intentions. This perception led George 
Washington to seek a decisive battle, or an attempt at a decisive battle, to demonstrate to 
the world that his continental army was capable of standing up to the more powerful 
British Army and, as a result, garner domestic and international support. Similarly, 
General Giap, even though the weaker actor, conducted the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the 
Easter Offensive in 1972, not to deter U.S. public opinion or even achieve victory, but to 
demonstrate to the South Vietnam populace, the Soviet Union and China that North 
Vietnam still presented a formidable threat against their more powerful adversary, 
thereby ensuring continued internal and external support. Consequently a display of force 
is attempted not only by the strong actor, but the weak actor as well, to demonstrate 
capability, resolve, and curry support. 
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Force implemented by a traditional warfare strategy is also, and most 
often, used for the “knockout blow.” This was demonstrated time and time again 
throughout the American Revolution and Vietnam War, although not always 
successfully, to put the final exclamation point on what was, up until that time, a war of 
detachment. This exclamation point and perception of force explains the second half of 
Max Boot’s guerrilla paradox, where the same guerrilla forces that defeat a stronger 
adversary inevitably become the very type of military—a conventional army—they 
defeated.341 This is due to the fact that once an opponent is considerable weakened and 
either no longer has support of the public or public support is waning, a traditional 
warfare-direct approach strategy serves as the knockout punch, the proverbial nail in the 
coffin, not only conveying one’s convictions to the stronger or weaker actor, but to the 
world writ large.  
c. Hypothesis 3: Hierarchical Command and Control Structure  
A weaker adversary’s lack of command and control structure contributes 
to an irregular warfare strategy. General Washington realized he did not have control 
over the partisan elements in the colonies or even the militias for that matter, but he used 
their lack of command and control to make up for his army’s extreme power 
disadvantages, continually encouraging the partisans and militias to harass the more 
powerful British army. Similarly, North Vietnam had little command and control over the 
Vietcong and even its own forces to a degree. The two incidents that contributed to the 
United States military involvement in Vietnam the most—the initial Gulf of Tonkin 
engagement on August 2, 1964, and the Vietcong attack on the U.S airbase at Pleiku in 
February of 1965—the North Vietnamese leadership was unaware of the attacks.   
If lack of command and control favors small unit decentralized tactics and 
operations, the hallmarks of an irregular warfare—guerrilla warfare strategy, does a 
professional army with advanced technology and training more likely result in a 
traditional warfare strategy?  A hierarchical command and control structure, while it does  
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not necessarily prevent an irregular warfare strategy, does appear to have an increased 
tendency to favor a strategy, predicated upon centralized operations, the concentration of 
mass, overwhelming firepower, and force.  
In summation, while the United States’ military industrial complex does 
not pull the puppet masters’ strings of war, the widely held belief that power implies 
victory is fueled in part by the military industrial complex providing blunt force power to 
wield in warfare. The amassing of weapons of war ultimately results in the utilization of 
overwhelming force, mass, and firepower concentrated at a specific time and place to, 
most importantly, obtain a quick and decisive victory, just as Clausewitz and Jomini 
wrote over 200 years ago. But Washington and the mighty British army did not have the 
writings of either war theorist to compel them to use overwhelming mass, firepower, and, 
maneuver, and yet repeatedly this traditional warfare mentality was used by both 
belligerents, and also by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army to elicit victory.  The 
implementation of force is widely seen to produce what most belligerents in war desire, 
achieving a quick victory when the time is right, and remarkably, even when it is not.  
B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Determining why the United States’ security mindset is predicated upon a 
traditional warfare strategy has resulted in four key implications for future strategy-
counterstrategy interactions. First, illuminating the enemy by placing an unparalleled 
emphasis on intelligence collection is critical to avert the use of overwhelming force, 
which more often than not results in creating more opposition than eliminating it. The 
overwhelming use of force that is assumed to achieve a decisive victory ultimately works 
against the strong actor if he cannot identify the enemy from the populace. There is 
obviously a reason that the British and Hessians remarked during the Revolution that if 
only the American colonists would stand and fight they would be able to defeat them, or 
why General Westmoreland publicly defied the Vietcong to attack, and said he was 
looking for a fight,342 waiting for the North Vietnamese to wage his type of war.343  
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Consequently, effective intelligence is critical in identifying the insurgent from 
the populace in order to prevent the tendency to revert to overwhelming force that only 
succeeds in negatively impacting the majority of the populace that may have been at one 
time been, if not supportive of the counterinsurgent, indifferent.  Westmoreland 
implemented forced “urbanization,” deliberately creating massive amounts of refugees, to 
secure the countryside to separate the insurgents from populace.344 In reality, all it did 
was create more insurgents or those willing to support the insurgency. Therefore, 
effective intelligence capabilities that focus on identifying and discriminately targeting 
the enemy are paramount in irregular warfare.  Military intelligence and operations alone, 
however, cannot effectively defeat an insurgency.  
Political, economic, and social reforms are critical in isolating the insurgents from 
the populace in addition to effective intelligence operations. Many within the British 
government, including the military, such as General and Admiral Howe, advocated 
implementing political reforms that would avert war and reach an agreement regarding 
the imposing taxes on the colonies without representation. The Tory party in power, 
however, opted for force. There were also those in the U.S. administration after the 
Vietminh defeated the French who wanted to focus on political reform of the South 
Vietnamese government.  The MAAG, however, believed focusing on political reform 
would detract from countering the growing insurgency, which it believed could only be 
achieved by obtaining a military victory.345 Neither the British leading up to or during 
the Revolutionary War, or the United States during the Vietnam War, placed the 
appropriate emphasis on political reform to deflate the insurgents’ cause. Implementing 
political reform is critical in developing support from the populace and isolating the 
insurgency or negating its cause all together.  
Second, small-maneuverable, decentralized operations are extremely effective 
against larger, more powerful forces.  When military force is used in irregular warfare, 
whether by the weak or strong actors, small unit operations utilizing decentralized 
command and control are more effective than large conventional force operations.  
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Throughout the Revolutionary War the Continental Army, militias, and partisans, 
repeatedly used small-unit, highly mobile operations effectively against British superior 
firepower and support trains. The same tactics were utilized by the Vietcong and NVA 
against the more powerful and better-resourced U.S. military. Although U.S. forces had 
overwhelming fire superiority and awesome mobility capabilities, the weaker adversaries 
were effectively able to negate the disproportionate power advantage by overwhelming, 
decentralized, small unit hit and run tactics. Conversely, when the United States did wage 
surgical strike operations, it had devastating effects on the enemy.  
And lastly, a pragmatic approach to warfare, not being fixated on any one strategy 
or time constraints, provides the greatest chances of achieving victory.  Ultimately, 
practical military decisions not tied to any one specific strategy or timetables have the 
advantage. George Washington and General Giap showed strikingly similar pragmatic 
characteristics by waging wars of detachment when they needed to deflect or dodge their 
enemy’s technological superior and force advantages.  They also pressed the attack when 
they needed to raise public support or awareness for their cause.  
Conversely, the mighty British Army in the American Revolutionary War and the 
powerful U.S. military in the Vietnam War both, to their detriment, almost zealously 
adhered to the utilization of force, seeing retreat as a sign of weakness. From General 
Burgoyne refusing to retreat and recuperate while pursuing the Continental Army 
throughout the Hudson Valley, to General Cornwallis’ decision to burn all his support 
trains and recklessly pursue NathanaelGreene throughout the Southern Colonies, to 
American military leadership in the Vietnam War continually responding with more 
troops and more bombs, each powerful military’s refusal to accept anything other than 
the use of force was only reinforcing failure. Additionally, a strong actor’s race against 
time to defeat his weaker adversary automatically puts him at a disadvantage. The U.S. 
government, when it decides to commit forces in irregular warfare, must effectively 
communicate to the American people that an irregular warfare strategy is a protracted 
warfare strategy, not simply a two-to-three year plan like Westmoreland’s repetitive 
attrition strategies in Vietnam.  
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Understanding overwhelming force does not automatically equate to an 
overwhelming victory in a relative short amount of time is key in asymmetric conflicts 
where one actor is considerably stronger than the other. Placing a paramount emphasis on 
intelligence collection to illuminate the adversary, while complimenting the utilization of 
small-unit maneuverable, autonomous forces with a focus on political, social, and 
economic reform takes time. Arreguín-Toft’s same approach strategic interaction, with a 
strong actor implementing an indirect irregular warfare strategy, focuses on gaining the 
support of the populace in order to alter or negate support for the weak actor’s indirect-
guerrilla warfare strategy. This approach ultimately results in the weaker adversary 
unable to deflect not only the stronger adversary’s military capabilities, but more 
importantly, its political, and economic capabilities.  
Many of these implications have already been codified in the U.S. Army’s Field 
Manual for Counterinsurgency Operations, FM 3-24; however, current military doctrine 
would be justly served if the traditional nine principles of war are identified as the 
“Principles of Traditional Warfare” and the principles of COIN are codified as the 
“Principles of Irregular Warfare.”  Junior officers and NCOs are continuously taught 
throughout their careers that “words mean something,” and doctrine, although often 
derided, institutionalizes the proper emphasis and prioritization on the tactics, operations, 
and strategy based upon the words chosen to define each.  
If U.S. military doctrine does not incorporate or distinguish the principles of 
irregular warfare from traditional warfare, the animosity, frustration, and potential shift 
away from irregular warfare will continue to grow. The U.S. military will unfortunately 
repeat the institutional knowledge dismissal of irregular warfare that occurred in the 
ensuing years after the Vietnam War and had to be painfully relearned during the past 
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